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ABSTRACT 
Does Central Bank Transparency Reduce Interest Rates?* 
Central banks have become increasingly transparent during the last decade. 
One of the main benefits of transparency predicted by theoretical models is 
that it enhances the credibility, reputation, and flexibility of monetary policy, 
which suggests that increased transparency should result in lower nominal 
interest rates. This paper exploits a detailed transparency data set to 
investigate this relationship for eight major central banks. It appears that for all 
central banks, the level of interest rates is affected by the degree of central 
bank transparency. In particular, the majority of the improvements in 
transparency are associated with significant effects on interest rates, 
controlling for economic conditions. In most of these cases, interest rates are 
lower, often by around 50 basis points, although in some instances 
transparency appears to have had a detrimental effect on interest rates. 
JEL Classification: E52 and E58 
Keywords: central bank transparency, interest rates and monetary policy 
Petra M Geraats 
Faculty of Economics & Politics  
University of Cambridge   
Sidgwick Avenue   
Cambridge   
CB3 9DD   
   
Tel: (44 1223) 335295  
Fax: (44 1223) 335475  
Email: petra.geraats@econ.cam.ac.uk  
 
For further Discussion Papers by this author see: 
www.cepr.org/pubs/new-dps/dplist.asp?authorid=148723 
Sylvester C W Eijffinger 
Department of Economics  
CentER Tilburg University   
PO Box 90153   
5000 LE Tilburg   
THE NETHERLANDS   
   
Tel: (31 13) 466 2411  
Fax: (31 13) 466 3042  
Email: s.c.w.eijffinger@uvt.nl  
 
For further Discussion Papers by this author see: 
www.cepr.org/pubs/new-dps/dplist.asp?authorid=120432 Carin A B van der Cruijsen 
Research Division  
De Nederlandsche Bank   
PO Box 90153   
5000 LE, Tilburg   
THE NETHERLANDS   
Email: c.a.b.van.der.cruijsen@dnb.nl  
 





*We thank seminar participants at the University of Oxford and at the 
CEPR/Banco de España European Summer Symposium in International 
Macroeconomics (ESSIM) in Tarragona for helpful comments. 
 
Submitted 27 January 2006 
 
 1 Introduction
Central banks have become increasingly transparent and consider transparency a key
feature of their monetary policy framework. Since central banks tend to be far more
forthcoming than is needed to meet statutory accountability requirements, it is widely
believed that transparency has considerable economic bene…ts. Theoretical models show
that transparency has the potential to enhance the credibility, reputation and ‡exibility
of monetary policy, which should enable central banks to set lower interest rates. The
contribution of this paper is to investigate this theoretical prediction using a unique
data set of transparency measures for major central banks from 1998 to 2002. We …nd
that improvements in transparency indeed tend to be associated with signi…cantly lower
interest rates when controlling for economic conditions.
Intuitively, the advantages of transparency in the form of greater credibility, reputa-
tion and ‡exibility derive from the fact that transparency makes it easier for the private
sector to infer the central bank’s intentions from monetary policy decisions and out-
comes. This allows a central bank to improve its credibility. It also gives the central
bank a greater incentive to build reputation as private sector in‡ation expectations be-
come more sensitive to monetary policy actions and outcomes that are not attributed
to economic shocks. At the same time, transparency makes it clear when monetary pol-
icy decisions are intended to o¤set economic shocks, so it gives the central bank greater
‡exibility to stabilize the economy without a¤ecting private sector in‡ation expectations.
These e¤ects of transparency should in‡uence the level of interest rates. In particular,
enhanced ‡exibility would allow a reduction in policy and short term interest rates with-
out increasing long term nominal interest rates, and improved reputation would reduce
in‡ation expectations and thereby long term nominal interest rates. This paper tests
empirically for the presence of such ‡exibility and reputation e¤ects on interest rates,
exploiting changes in the degree of central bank transparency over time based on an
index by Eij¢nger and Geraats (2004).
In many instances, improvements in transparency tend to coincide with lower interest
rates, when controlled for the economic situation using in‡ation and output. The empir-
ical results show signi…cant reductions in interest rates for all countries in our sample:
the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA), the European Central Bank (ECB), the Bank of
Japan (BoJ), the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ), the Swedish Riksbank (SRB),
the Swiss National Bank (SNB), the Bank of England (BoE) and the Federal Reserve
(Fed). But there are some transparency increases that did not signi…cantly in‡uence
interest rates, or had detrimental ‡exibility or reputation e¤ects. In some cases there
appears to be a trade-o¤ between ‡exibility and reputation.
There is an increasing number of empirical studies suggesting that central bank trans-
parency is bene…cial. The move towards greater transparency appears to have reduced
1the e¤ect of monetary policy actions on …nancial markets in the UK ( Haldane and Read
(2000); Clare and Courtenay (2001)) and Canada (Muller and Zelmer 1999). US bond
markets have been more e¢cient and less volatile since Fed policy transparency in 1994
(Ra¤erty and Tomljanovich 2002). The publication of MPC voting records in the UK has
made it easier to predict future monetary policy decisions (Gerlach-Kristen 2004). In ad-
dition, using data from 20 countries, higher quality in‡ation reports are associated with
smaller market interest rate surprises from monetary policy decisions (Fracasso, Genberg
and Wyplosz 2003). Furthermore, there is cross-section evidence that the publication of
forward-looking analysis by central banks reduces average in‡ation and diminishes the
sacri…ce ratio (Chortareas, Stasavage and Sterne (2002a), (2002b), (2003)). However,
the present paper is the …rst to use detailed time-series data on transparency and to
investigate the e¤ects on the level short and long term nominal interest rates.
In the next section a simple model that captures the ‡exibility and reputation e¤ects
of transparency on short and long nominal interest rates is presented. Then, section 3
describes the data used in the empirical analysis, including the transparency measures.
The empirical results are presented in section 4, and conclusions are drawn in section 5.
2 Stylized Model
We use a highly stylized model to illustrate the ‡exibility and reputation e¤ects of central
bank transparency on interest rates. Geraats (2000) shows how transparency enhances
‡exibility and reputation in a more sophisticated, dynamic model.1 For a comprehensive
survey of the literature on transparency of monetary policy, see Geraats (2002).
Suppose the central bank has an in‡ation target ¿, about which the public has im-
perfect information. In particular, the public has a Bayesian prior on the in‡ation target
such that ¿ » N (¹ ¿;￿2
¿). Uncertainty about the target, or imperfect credibility, is re-
‡ected by ￿2
¿ > 0. In addition, suppose that the central bank su¤ers from a reputation
problem in the sense that the prior mean exceeds the actual in‡ation target: ¹ ¿ > ¿. The
monetary policy instrument set by the central bank is the short term nominal interest
rate s:
s = c ¡ ¿ + " (1)
where c > 0 is a constant re‡ecting the ‘neutral’ policy rate, and " » N (0;￿2
") is an
economic shock that the central bank decides to o¤set, which is independent of ¿. In this
short term model, a higher in‡ation target ¿ leads to expansionary monetary policy and
1It should be noted that some theoretical papers, including Cukierman (2001) and Jensen
(2002), …nd that transparency reduces ‡exibility. This occurs when the private sector learns
about supply shocks before it forms its in‡ation expectations that a¤ect the contemporaneous
Phillips curve. This induces a worsening of the in‡ation-output tradeo¤.
2reduces the short term interest rate s due to the liquidity e¤ect. The long term nominal
interest rate is determined by the long real interest rate r and private sector in‡ation
expectations z, so
l = r + z (2)
A higher level of in‡ation z anticipated by the public increases the long term nominal
interest rate l due to the Fisher e¤ect.
2 The public has rational expectations and uses
the policy rate s as a signal of the central bank’s in‡ation target ¿, so that
z = EP [¿js] (3)
where EP [¿js] denotes the private sector’s posterior mean of the in‡ation target.
In the case of transparency (denoted by superscript T ), the central bank conveys to
the private sector (e.g. by publishing forecasts, minutes or policy explanations) what
economic shocks " it is responding to. This means that the public can perfectly infer the
central bank’s intention ¿ from the policy instrument s, so that the long term nominal
interest rate equals
lT = r + ¿ (4)
In the case of opacity (denoted by superscript O), the economic disturbance " is
not observed by the private sector. As a consequence, the public engages in Bayesian
updating, or equivalently, solves a signal-extraction problem when it tries to infer the
central bank’s in‡ation target ¿ from the policy instrument s. So, the long term nominal
interest rate equals3












(s ¡ c) (5)
This shows that a change in the short interest rate a¤ects the long interest rate in the
opposite direction, thereby tilting the yield curve. Substituting (1) into (5) gives













A comparison of the outcomes under transparency (4) and opacity (6) reveals two
di¤erences. First, under opacity, the stabilization of economic shocks is complicated by
the e¤ect on the long term interest rate. For instance, suppose the central bank would
like to o¤set a negative demand shock " < 0 by reducing the policy rate s. The lack
of transparency causes the private sector to partly attribute the lower interest rate s to
2Note that over time, this also increases short term in‡ation expectations (which are …xed
in the short term) and thereby raises the neutral policy rate c. Thus, the policy rate s would
increase in the long run, which would make (1) and (2) consistent with the expectations theory
of the term structure.
3Use the fact that for two jointly normal variables x and y, E[yjx] = E[y]+
Covfy;xg
Var[x] (x ¡ E[x]).
3a high in‡ation target ¿. This increases the long term nominal interest rate l, which
hampers the central bank’s ability to stimulate the economy. In contrast, in the presence
of transparency, the long rate remains stable, thereby providing the central bank greater
‡exibility to o¤set economic disturbances without compromising its credibility.
Second, greater transparency allows the private sector to more accurately infer the
central bank’s in‡ation target ¿ from the policy rate s, which leads to lower in‡ation
expectations z and reduces the long term nominal rate l (as ¹ ¿ > ¿). However, under
opacity, private sector expectations are less responsive to policy actions, so the central
bank …ndsit much more di¢cult to improve its reputation. Similar in spirit, transparency
could make it easier for the private sector to infer the in‡ation target ¿ from in‡ation
outcomes (e.g. by publishing unanticipated transmission disturbances). This would also
reduce private sector in‡ation expectations z and thereby the long nominal rate l.
To summarize, transparency could generate two bene…cial e¤ects. It could provide
the central bank greater ‡exibility to stabilize economic shocks by reducing the short
term interest rate without risking a loss of reputation in the form of higher long term
nominal rates. In addition, it could have a desirable reputation e¤ect that lowers in‡ation
expectations and the long term nominal interest rate. As a result, it is possible to
distinguish between the ‡exibility and reputation e¤ects of transparency.
3 Data
In this paper, the rich transparency database collected by Eij¢nger and Geraats (2004)
is exploited. In particular, changes in the Eij¢nger and Geraats (2004) index are used
to analyze the relation between transparency and interest rates over time. There are a
few other measures of transparency of monetary policy: Fry, Julius, Mahadeva, Roger
and Sterne (2000) construct an index of ‘policy explanations’ based on a comprehensive
survey of 94 central banks; Bini-Smaghi and Gros (2001) present an indicator of central
bank transparency and accountability for six major central banks, and de Haan and
Amtenbrink (2002) suggest a variation on this. However, these measures are all static,
so they cannot be used for time series analysis.
The Eij¢nger and Geraats (2004) index distinguishes …ve aspects of transparency
relevant for monetary policymaking, each of which is quanti…ed based on three criteria
that refer to factual information disclosures.
1. Political (formal objectives, quantitative targets, and institutional arrangements).
2. Economic (data, models and internal forecasts used for policy decisions).
3. Procedural (strategy, minutes and voting records, capturing how policy decisions
are made).
44. Policy (prompt announcement and explanation of policy actions, and policy incli-
nation).
5. Operational (control errors, transmission disturbances, and formal evaluation of
policy outcomes).
The index is constructed for nine major central banks (Reserve Bank of Australia,
Bank of Canada, European Central Bank, Bank of Japan, Reserve Bank of New Zealand,
Swedish Riksbank, Swiss National Bank, Bank of England, US Federal Reserve) for the
period 1998-2002.
The Eij¢nger and Geraats (2004) index shows a great variety in the degree of trans-
parency, both across central banks and over time. The most transparent central banks
are the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Swedish Riksbank and the Bank of England,
which are all in‡ation targeters. However, the adoption of in‡ation targeting does not
guarantee a high degree of transparency, as is shown by the fact that the Reserve Bank of
Australia gets one of the lowest scores in the sample. Furthermore, many central banks
have experienced signi…cant improvements in transparency over time. Sweden, which
has been an in‡ation targeter since 1993, achieved the most impressive advance in the
transparency index from 1998 to 2002. These examples also show that the adoption of
in‡ation targeting can be a very poor proxy for the degree of central bank transparency.
The empirical analysis investigateshow the level of interest ratesis a¤ected by changes
in transparency over time, controlling for the macroeconomic situation in the form of
in‡ation and output. Changes in the Eij¢nger and Geraats (2004) index are used to
construct transparency indicator variables dMM=YY for each central bank that switch
from 0 to 1 on the date (coded as MM=Y Y ) at which the change in index took place.
This leads to 15 indicators which are supplemented by 4 indicators that capture major
transparency events that occurred before the sample of Eij¢nger and Geraats (2004).
Appendix A.1 contains a list of all the transparency indicator variables, including a
detailed description of the corresponding change in transparency and the aspect(s) it
pertains to. The Bank of Canada was the only central bank that did not change any of
its transparency scores over the sample, so it was dropped.
Three di¤erent interest rates, policy, short and long, are used in the analysis. The
policy rate ip is the interest rate that the central bank employs as its policy instrument
or target. The short interest rate is is the three-month deposit rate or the money market
rate. And the long nominal rate il is the nominal yield on 10-year government bonds.
End of the quarter, quarterly data is used.
Two variables are used to control for macroeconomic conditions, in‡ation and the
output gap. In‡ation is measured as the annual percentage change in the Consumer
Price Index (CPI). The measure for the output gap is the percentage deviation from
5the trend in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) computed using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP)
…lter. Further details about the data are available in the Appendix A.2.1.
To test whether the results still hold when monthly data are used, monthly regressions
have been estimated as well. Monthly production data is available for …ve out of the eight
central banks: the ECB, BoJ, SRB, BoE and the Fed. In several cases average data is
used instead of end of the month data. Since changes in the interest rate take longer to
a¤ect average values, regressions with average rates use the one-month lagged value of
the transparency indicator to facilitate comparability of the results across rates. So, for
average rates, transparency changes in the …rst month of the year lead to a change in the
indicator in the next month. See Appendix A.2.2 for more detailed information about
the applied monthly data.
4 Empirical Results
This section starts with a detailed explanation of the empirical methods that we used
to analyze the e¤ect of central bank transparency on the ‡exibility and reputation of
central banks. This is followed by the discussion of the results.
4.1 Method
The empirical analysis of the e¤ect of central bank transparency on the level of interest
rates is complicated by two stylized facts: (i) interest rates tend to vary substantially
over the business cycle by about 200-400 basis points; (ii) the degree of central bank
transparency has increased signi…cantly over time but not uniformly across countries,
as documented by Eij¢nger and Geraats (2004). As a result, cross-section correlations
between the (level or average of the) interest rate and transparency could be very mis-
leading. Instead, we investigate how the level of the interest rate is a¤ected by changes in
transparency over time. Since the interest rate i depends on macroeconomic conditions,
we include in‡ation (…) and the output gap (y) as control variables, as well as lagged
interest rates to absorb serial correlation. The changes in transparency are captured by












MM=Y Y cMM=YY dMM=YY;t + "t (7)
where i 2 fip;is;ilg. Although this resembles the so-called Taylor rule, which has a struc-
tural interpretation as a policy reaction function, we focus on the conditional expectations
interpretation of (7). We focus in particular on the question whether improvements in
6transparency are associated with a reduction in interest rates, controlling for macroeco-
nomic conditions.
To control for expected future conditions as well, an additional speci…cation is con-
sidered that also includes forward looking elements, in particular expected future values




















cMM=YYdMM=YY;t + ·t (8)
where ·t ´ "t +
PK…
k=0 c…;k(Et […t+k] ¡ …t+k) +
PKy
k=0 cy;k (Et[yt+k] ¡ yt+k) is white noise.
The main challenge in the estimation of (7) and (8) is to obtain results that pass the
usual diagnostic tests (especially for autocorrelation). Instead of using a trial-and-error
approach to try to …nd a suitable speci…cation for each country and interest rate, we
decided to adopt a more systematic method and used the automatic econometric model
selection program PcGets, which is based on the general-to-speci…c methodology (Hendry
(1995)). For all countries and interest rates, (7) and (8) are used as the so-called ‘General
Unrestricted Models’ (GUMs), which are starting point of the automatic selection of an
undominated, congruent model based on the results of diagnostic tests.4
The sample period runs from 1993 through 2002, covering the decade in which some
of the most interesting changes in transparency practices have taken place. Ending the
sample in 2002 allows for the inclusion of forward looking explanatory variables based
on more recent data (2002-2004). For the backward looking regressions with quarterly
data (7), the number of lags in the GUM was set to L… = Ly = Li = 5. The same lags
were used in the forward looking regressions with quarterly data (8), which also include
several forward looking terms. A selection of forward looking terms had to be made
because of the limited number of observations at our disposal. In that light, we included
the current, one year ahead, and two years ahead in‡ation rate, k 2 f0;4;8g, and the
current and one year ahead output gap, n 2 f0;4g.
For the forward-looking regressions, several instruments are used to experiment with;
lags up to two years of ip, is, il, and if available of im (medium term interest rate),
y and …. We experimented both with the lag length as well as with the combination
of instruments (under the precondition that ip and is were not used together because
of multicollinearity). The selection of the set of instrument eventually depended on
4“Monte Carlo experiments demonstrate that PcGets recovers the correct speci…cation from a general
model with size and power close to commencing from the data-generating process (DGP) itself.” (Hendry
and Krolzig (2001), p.3)
7several factors: (i) whether the number of instruments was not too large, in the sense
that they cause run time errors; (ii) whether the instruments were valid according to
the Sargan test; (iii) whether the instruments have signi…cant explanatory power for
the explanatory endogenous variables; (iv) whether the p-values of the diagnostic tests
of the speci…c model were, if possible, at least 0.025 (which is in line with our initial
settings). The null hypothesis of the Sargan test is that the instrumental variables are
valid, uncorrelated to some set of residuals, and therefore the instruments appear to be
healthy. This test is asymptotically distributed as ￿2 (q) when the q over-identifying
instruments are independent of the regression error. The selection criteria we used is
whether the p-value of this test is = 0.05.
The backward looking regressions are estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (using
GETS), whereas the forward looking regressions with endogenous explanatory variables
…t+k and yt+n, for k 2 f0;4;8g and n 2 f0;4g, are estimated with Instrumental Variables
(using GETSIVE). In our baseline scenario all transparency dummies are forced to be
included in the selected speci…c model. The selection strategy that is chosen is the
built-in sample size adjusted liberal strategy. This strategy focuses on minimizing the
non-selection probability of variables that are relevant.
5
In addition to the regressions that were performed with quarterly data, regressions
with monthly data were carried out as well. As mentioned before, monthly data is
available for …ve out of eight central banks: the ECB, the BoJ, the SRB, the BoE and the
Fed. To make the results, as much as possible, comparable with the quarterly regression
results, the GUMs are constructed in a analogous manner. Therefore L… = Ly = Li = 15,
and k 2 f0;12;24g and n 2 f0; 12g. The instruments include lags up to 24 periods (so
as before the instruments go two years back in time).
Tables 1-13 with regression results show the coe¢cient estimates with p-values in
brackets. The Wald statistic for the joint test that dMM=YY = 0 for all k transparency
indicators is reported, together with p-values in brackets. Indicator variables and Wald
test signi…cant at the 10% level are presented in bold. The outcomes of several diag-
nostic test are reported in the result tables as well. Since the regressions include lagged
dependent variables it is important to test for autocorrelation to ensure consistency of the
coe¢cient estimates. The outcomes of the Lagrange-multiplier (LM) test for autocorre-
lation up to fourth order, that has a ￿2 (4) distribution, including p-values in brackets are
5Only two adjustments were made to this setting. In light of the relatively limited sample size,
the loosest signi…cance level for the diagnostic tests was increased from 0.01 to 0.025. In addition,
a heteroskedasticity test was activated (in addition to the standard tests in PcGets, namely Chow
tests, normality test, autocorrelation test, and autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity test). If a
diagnostic test is violated for the GUM at the set signi…cance level, thenPcGets discards this test and no
longer reports it, in which case any missing diagnostics tests were obtained separately for each selected
speci…c model.
8presented. The null hypothesis is that there is no autocorrelation; the errors are white
noise. Another diagnostic test that is performed is a test for heteroskedasticity. The
null hypothesis of this F-test is that there is unconditional homoskedasticity, see White
(1980). In addition, it is tested for fourth-order autoregressive conditional heteroskedas-
ticity in the residuals with a F-test, see Engle (1982). The normality test is a ￿2 (2) test
for whether the skewness and kurtosis of the residuals is in line with a normal distribu-
tion, which is the null hypothesis of the test, see Doornik and Hansen (1994). The …nal
test presented is the Sargan test, which is explained before. The standard error of the
regression (s.e.e.) and the R2 give an indication of the goodness of …t of the regressions.
In addition to the baseline strategy that is applied in the regressions with quarterly
data, two other settings are used to check for the robustness of the obtained results. In
the …rst one, the transparency dummies are not forced to reappear in the selected model.
In the second alternative speci…cation, we use a conservative instead of a liberal selection
strategy. This strategy is built-in as well but in contrast to the liberal strategy it focuses
on minimizing the non-deletion probability of nuisance variables. The results of these
two robustness checks are presented in Appendix A.3 (Tables 16-19).
The results for each of the eight central banks are now discussed in turn.
4.2 Country Speci…c Results
Reserve Bank of Australia
The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) only experienced one (minor) improvement
to transparency. It clari…ed in October 2001 that it uses a particular macroeconometric
model for policy analysis. This model had already been published by the Bank as a
research discussion paper without receiving its formal endorsement.
The regression results in Table 1 indicate that this transparency increase was ben-
e…cial. It went along with lower short term and policy rates which indicate increased
‡exibility. The reputation of the RBA did not change. These …ndings still hold when
the forward looking GUM is used. The robustness checks, presented in Appendix A.3,
support these …ndings. The e¤ect that we found seems to be too strong for such a minor
transparency increase. One reason for the larger than expected coe¢cients could be that
we are picking up the 9/11 e¤ect.
European Central Bank
The European Central Bank (ECB) has become more transparent in two respects. It
started releasing semiannual medium term sta¤ projections for in‡ation and output in
December 2000 and it published its structural macroeconomic model of the euro zone.6
6It should be mentioned that the publication of projections has been triggered by the
9In addition, in November 2001 the ECB started providing policy explanations after each
monetary policy meeting by reducing the frequency of meetings from twice to once a
month so that each monetary policy meeting is followed by a press conference.
Considering the major change that took place with the start of the European Mone-
tary Union (EMU) in January 1999, we introduced an additional indicator variable EM U
to investigate its e¤ect.
The results in Table 2 show many signi…cant coe¢cients for transparency. The in-
crease in economic transparency, indicated by d12=00, went along with lower interest rates.
Only in one instance, the backward looking case with long term rates, the e¤ect was sig-
ni…cant. This gives some minor support for a bene…cial reputation e¤ect. The policy
transparency increase, indicated with d11=01, signi…cantly went along with lower policy
rates (for which we used Eonia to ensure comparability before and after EMU) in the
backward looking speci…cation. When the forward looking GUM is applied, the coe¢-
cient on the transparency indicator d11=01 is signi…cant and sizeable in all three kinds of
interest rate regressions. These results indicate that increased policy transparency has
been bene…cial, both for the ‡exibility as well as for the reputation of the ECB. The
backward looking regressions indicate that the start of the EMU was not bene…cial for
reputation and ‡exibility of the ECB but this …nding disappears when the forward look-
ing speci…cation is used. The robustness checks presented in Appendix A.3 support all
…ndings.
The results of the regressions with monthly data are presented in Table 3. They point
out as well that the economic transparency increase went along with lower interest rates,
but now there is a signi…cantly bene…cial ‡exibility e¤ect which holds in the backward
looking case as well as in the forward looking case. No signi…cant e¤ect could be found
for the increase in policy transparency. The detrimental e¤ect of the start of EMU is
con…rmed by both the backward looking results and the forward looking results.
All in all, the results suggest that both the increase in policy and economic trans-
parency were bene…cial to the ECB. The results indicate that the start of the EMU was
detrimental.
Bank of Japan
The Bank of Japan (BoJ) became signi…cantly more transparent in January 1998
when a new monetary policy framework was implemented in anticipation of the entry into
force of an amendment to the Bank of Japan Law on April 1, 1998. Since January 1998,
Committee on Economic and Monetary A¤airs of the European Parliament in its quar-
terly Monetary Dialogue with the ECB based on Article 113(3) of the Treaty on European
Union and on the advice of its Panel of Experts in their quarterly Brie…ng Paper (see:
www.europarl.eu.int/committees/econ/_home.htm and click on ’Monetary Dialogue with the
ECB’).
10monetary policy decisions have been made at regular meetings of the Policy Board, which
became autonomous and started publishing minutes of the monetary policy meetings.
The amendment also speci…ed price stability as the explicit aim of monetary policy,
increased the e¤ective independence of the Bank and required a semi-annual report on
monetary policy to the Diet (parliament).
The BoJ also increased its transparency in October 2000 when it started publishing
semi-annual short term forecasts for in‡ation and output made by the Policy Board.
Finally, the Bank actually su¤ered from a decrease in its transparency score in March
2001 when it abandoned its use of the uncollateralized overnight call rate, which has been
virtually zero since February 1999, to adopt the outstanding balance of current accounts
at the Bank as its main operating target. Unfortunately, this quantitative target is quite
loose and there are wide ‡uctuations that are not explained, creating opacity about
control errors.
Table 4 shows that the changes in transparency of the BoJ appeared to have had
only small e¤ects on interest rates. None of the dummy coe¢cients are signi…cant in the
backward looking speci…cation. Not much changes when forward looking term are added.
Only in two instances some evidence is found for increased ‡exibility of the BoJ. This
holds for the political and procedural transparency increases, indicated by d01=98, in the
regression with short rate data and for the operational transparency increase, indicated
by d03=01, in the regression with policy rate data. The coe¢cient of the operational
transparency indicator d10=00 is insigni…cant in all regressions.
The monthly regression results are reported in Table 5. As in the quarterly regressions,
the operational transparency change had no signi…cant impact. Again signi…cant e¤ects
of the other transparency changes on ‡exibility can be found but these are, at least partly,
contrasting with earlier …ndings.
On the whole, the e¤ects of the transparency change of the Bank of Japan seem to
be small and only in‡uencing ‡exibility. Part of the regressions su¤er from normality
problems, which is understandably a problem because the policy rate lies around zero. If
we substantiate from these regression results we …nd some support for increased ‡exibility
after the political, procedural and economic transparency increases.
Reserve Bank of New Zealand
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) accomplished a major improvement in
transparency in March 1999 when it abandoned the use of a target for the Monetary
Conditions Index (MCI), which is a weighted average of the trade-weighted exchange
rate and the 90-day interest rate, to convey its monetary policy stance. Instead, it
introduced the O¢cial Cash Rate, which is perfectly controlled and thereby eliminates
operational uncertainty. In addition, it started to provide explanations of policy changes
as well as quarterly, three-year ahead, unconditional forecasts for the 90-day interest
11rate. In addition, there was an increase in policy transparency in December 2000 when
the RBNZ started to provide an explanation of policy decisions even when there is no
adjustment of the O¢cial Cash Rate.
The backward looking results inTable 6 show that the most recent policy transparency
increase, indicated by d12=00, reduced both policy (for which we used the overnight inter-
bank rate to ensure comparability before and after adoption of the O¢cial Cash Rate),
short (the money market rate, which equals the policy rate) and long term rates. The
coe¢cient of d12=00 is signi…cant in the backward looking long term rate regression and in
the forward looking policy and short term rate regressions. The policy and operational
transparency increases, indicated by d03=99, had no signi…cant impact.
Overall, the results of the RNBZ regressions support the idea that transparency in-
creases can be bene…cial for both ‡exibility and reputation. Note that these results
should be interpreted with some care, because some of the regressions su¤er from nor-
mality problems.
Swedish Riksbank
The Swedish Riksbank (SRB) experienced the greatest number of transparency events
in our sample. The Riksbank started publishing its in‡ation forecasts in the quarterly
In‡ation Report in March 1997, enhancing economic transparency. Amendments to
the Constitution Act and Sveriges Riksbank Act, which entered into force in January
1999, clari…ed the Riksbank’s institutional independence and main objective. This was
followed by policy explanations in the case of no-change decisions and the release of
data on capacity utilization in the last quarter of 1999, which contributed to policy and
economic transparency. Operational transparency was improved by an annual evaluation
of past in‡ation forecast errors, which started in March 2000. Finally, a policy inclination
was …rst provided in March 2002, quickly followed by the disclosure of attributed votes
in the minutes of the monetary policy meetings of the Executive Board.
The results of all the changes in transparency are shown in Table 7. Three out
of …ve transparency changes seem to have had a signi…cant impact on the ‡exibility
and reputation of the SRB. The political transparency increase, indicated by d01=99, is
associated with higher ‡exibility at the cost of reputation. This …nding holds both based
on the backward looking and on the forward looking speci…cation. Some evidence is
found that the opposite holds for the procedural and policy increases which are indicated
by d03=02. The economic transparency increase, indicated by d03=97, seems to have had a
detrimental e¤ect. These …ndings are robust in the sense that the regressions based on
two other selection procedures, of which the results are presented in Appendix A.3, are
in line with these …ndings.
In contrast, when monthly data is applied the results, presented in Table 8, di¤er on
some points. The results suggest that transparency changes indicated by d10=99 go along
12with decreased ‡exibility, whereas the operational transparency increase is followed with
increased ‡exibility. The 1997 transparency increase was, again, followed by increased
reputation but according to these results not at the cost of ‡exibility. In contrast to
earlier …ndings, the political transparency increase, indicated by d01=99, seems to have had
a detrimental e¤ect. Again some evidence is found that the most recent transparency
increases, indicated by d03=02, went along with lower long term interest rates, but the
evidence on short term rates is unclear.
All in all, the results of the SRB are mixed. Results that can be found both with
quarterly as well as with monthly data are the increase in reputation after the 1997
transparency increase and the most recent transparency increases. In contrast, the 1999
political transparency increase was followed by lower long term rates. The Wald tests
values are in almost all regressions signi…cant, indicating that multicollinearity could be
a problem. Therefore these results should be interpreted with some care.
Swiss National Bank
The Swiss National Bank (SNB) experienced a signi…cant change in its monetary
policy framework in December 1999, with the announcement of a quantitative de…nition
of price stability, quickly followed by the entry into force of a constitutional amendment
that enshrined the Bank’s independence. In addition, the SNB started to release three-
year ahead in‡ation forecasts at semiannual frequency. On the downside, it introduced
an operational target range for the LIBOR of 100 basis points, without accounting for
signi…cant ‡uctuations, thereby reducing operational transparency.
The backward looking and forward looking regression results in Table 9 indicate that
the transparency increases went along with increased reputation. However, the ‡exibility
e¤ect is less clear. From the backward looking regressions ‡exibility seems to be reduced
after the transparency increases, but when a more complete GUM with forward looking
terms is used it can be shown that the transparency changes were bene…cial for ‡exibility
as well.
Overall, the results indicate that the transparency change by the SNB went along
with increased reputation, whereas the e¤ect on ‡exibility is less clear.
Bank of England
The Bank of England (BoE) was granted operational independence in 1997 and the
…rst interest rate decision by the independent Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) was
made in June 1997. This greatly reduced uncertainty about potential political in‡uences
in monetary policy. In addition, in April 1999 the Bank became remarkably open about
the economic information it uses for policy decisions by publishing extensive documenta-
tion about its policy models and even the computer code of its macroeconometric model.
In August 1999, operational transparency was enhanced by the introduction of an annual
13evaluation of the MPC’s forecasting record for in‡ation and output.
The regression results reported in Table 10 show that the increase in political trans-
parency, indicated by d06=97, has had a bene…cial reputation e¤ect. It was followed by
a reduction in the long nominal interest rate of about 100 basis points but this came
at the cost of ‡exibility. Note that this transparency event was truly exogenous as it
resulted from the surprising move by the new Labor government in 1997 to grant the
Bank of England independence. The coe¢cients of the economic transparency increase,
indicated by d04=99, and the operational transparency increase in August 1999, indicated
by d08=99, are not signi…cant in the backward looking regression. The forward looking
regressions indicate a detrimental reputation e¤ect of the economic transparency increase
and a detrimental ‡exibility e¤ect of the operational transparency increase.
It is checked whether these results can be con…rmed by monthly data. Based on these
regressions, of which the results are presented in Table 11, it is again found that the
operational independence was followed by lower long term rates at the cost of ‡exibility.
Based on the forward looking regressions the economic transparency increase still was
followed by signi…cantly higher long term rates. In contrast, the operational transparency
increase seems to have been bene…cial for the reputation of the Bank of England and its
suggested detrimental e¤ect on the ‡exibility of the BoE is not con…rmed.
Overall, we …nd that operational independence was bene…cial for the reputation of the
BoE, but at the cost of ‡exibility. In contrast, some support is found that the economic
transparency increase was followed by higher long term rates. The evidence on the e¤ect
of the operational transparency increase is not obvious and too scarce to put much weight
on.
Federal Reserve
The Federal Reserve (Fed) …rst provided a prompt announcement of its Federal Funds
rate decision in February 1994, thereby contributing to greater policy transparency. In
addition, it became more forthcoming about its policy stance in May 1999 when it started
to provide a brief explanation of every policy decision at the time of announcement, as
well as an explicit policy inclination.
Table 12 shows that the …rst transparency event was followed by higher interest rates
which is signi…cant in part of the regressions. Although this may sound detrimental,
it was actually the intended purpose of the Fed. In fact, after a long 1.5 year spell
of a constant Federal Funds rate target, the Fed decided to promptly announce a 50
basis point increase to have the maximum e¤ect. So, this transparency event was clearly
endogenous to the interest rate decision. An alternative interpretation of the signi…cant
positive e¤ects of d02=94 is that interest rates in the …rst year of the sample were relatively
low compared to economic conditions. The introduction of an explicit policy inclination
in 1999, indicated by d05=99, appeared to have enhanced the ‡exibility of the Fed as it
14is followed by a reduction of policy and short rates by about 50 basis points, controlling
for in‡ation and output. In addition, it seems to have had an even larger bene…cial
reputation e¤ect. The …ndings are robust to the use of several other settings, as can be
seen in Appendix A.3.
The regression results with monthly production data, see Table 13, support these
…ndings but the magnitude of the e¤ect seems to be smaller, about 20 basis points.
On the whole, we …nd evidence that supports the importance of central bank trans-
parency.
An overview of the empirical …ndings of the estimations based on a backward looking
GUM and quarterly data are provided in Table 14, the ones that result from the forward
looking GUM with quarterly data can be found in Table 15. The regression results suggest
that all Central Banks bene…ted at least once from increased transparency. Although
central bank transparency is bene…cial in a lot of cases, this statement does not always
hold. In some cases, it went along with higher interest rates. Part of the transparency
changes did not signi…cantly a¤ect any interest rates, which support the point of view
that not all aspects of transparency are of the same relevance from an economic point of
view.
5 Conclusion
Central bank transparency has become one of the key features of monetary policy frame-
works during the last decade. Transparency is often alleged to provide monetary policy-
makers reputational advantages and greater ‡exibility to stabilize the economy. However,
empirical evidence of such bene…ts has been sparse. This paper shows that increases in
transparency over time often coincide with lower levels of policy, short and/or long nom-
inal interest rates, controlling for macroeconomic conditions.
Some of the changes in transparency appear to have been driven by external, political
in‡uences, which suggests these events can be treated as exogenous and used to estimate
the e¤ect of transparency on interest rates. The empirical results presented in this paper
suggest that several aspects of transparency could indeed provide greater ‡exibility in
the form of lower short term interest rates, without endangering credibility. In addition,
there is evidence that transparency could enhance the central bank’s reputation and
reduce long term nominal interest rates. The paper shows that these e¤ects can be eco-
nomically signi…cant. The empirical results show economically signi…cant reductions in
interest rates for all eight central banks in our sample. Nevertheless, not all transparency
increases seem to have been bene…cial. Sometimes there seems to be a trade-o¤ between
reputation and ‡exibility. In addition, part of the changes in transparency did not have
15a signi…cant e¤ect at all. The …ndings show that only part of the central banks in our
sample faced detrimental transparency e¤ects. When it is looked at the results based on
the more complete forward looking GUM, of which a summary of the results is presented
in Table 15, detrimental unexpected e¤ects were only found for the BoE and the SRB,
while the results of the SRB should be interpreted with care because they su¤er from
multicollinearity.
On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that many of the increases in trans-
parency are not entirely the central bank’s initiative, but also carefully timed and induced
by economic circumstances. In these instances, our results indicate that central banks
often prefer to become more transparent when interest rates are low compared to the
macroeconomic situation. This is not surprising given the evidence that transparency
has the potential to signi…cantly improve ‡exibility and reputation.
This paper establishes that controlling for macroeconomic conditions, central bank
transparency matters. On the whole, the scale tips in favour of transparency.
16Table 1: Reserve Bank of Australia (Q)
backward looking forward looking
ip (1) is (2) il (3) ip (4) is (5) il (6)
c 2.04 [0.00] 1.81 [0.00] 3.38 [0.00] 2.40 [0.00]
i¡1 0.89 [0.00] 1.45 [0.00] 1.28 [0.00] 0.67 [0.00] 1.05 [0.00] 1.11 [0.00]
i¡2 -0.74 [0.00] -0.27 [0.08] -0.40 [0.00] -0.59 [0.02]
i¡3 0.35 [0.07] 0.39 [0.02]
i¡5 -0.32 [0.00] -0.38 [0.00] -0.18 [0.03]
y¡1 0.30 [0.00] 0.30 [0.01]
y¡2 0.19 [0.02]
y¡5 -0.32 [0.00] -0.15 [0.02] -0.34 [0.00] -0.25 [0.00]
…¡1 -0.22 [0.07] -0.27 [0.02]
…¡2 -0.14 [0.01] 0.30 [0.02] 0.29 [0.01]
…¡4 0.18 [0.00]
…¡5 0.20 [0.00] -0.19 [0.04]
y 0.03 [0.80] 0.21 [0.04]
y+4 -0.21 [0.08] -0.30 [0.03]
… 0.03 [0.67]
…+4 0.20 [0.00]
…+8 -0.21 [0.00] -0.16 [0.00]
d10=01: eco. -0.94 [0.01] -0.43 [0.06] 0.46 [0.25] -0.65 [0.00] -0.54 [0.00] -0.25 [0.38]
normality 3.17 [0.21] 1.18 [0.56] 1.49 [0.47] 4.83 [0.09] 0.09 [0.96] 1.19 [0.55]
AR 1.61 [0.20] 2.53 [0.06] 1.70 [0.18] 3.18 [0.03] 1.37 [0.27] 0.50 [0.74]
ARCH 0.52 [0.72] 0.67 [0.62] 0.66 [0.63] 0.12 [0.97] 0.52 [0.72] 0.51 [0.73]
hetero 12.00 [0.36] 13.08 [0.60] 11.97 [0.37] 22.52 [0.17] 16.45 [0.35] 22.88 [0.04]
wald 8.02 [0.00] 3.75 [0.05] 1.35 [0.25] 11.3 [0.00] 9.95 [0.00] 0.79 [0.37]
Sargan 28.92 [0.09] 10.76 [0.90] 17.96 [0.46]
s.e.e. 0.35 0.27 0.59 0.29 0.26 0.54
R2 0.91 0.94 0.87 0.94 0.95 0.89
Note: P-values are in brackets. Data period: 1993Q1-2002Q4. Additional instruments



















17Table 2: European Central Bank (Q)
backward looking forward looking
ip (1) is (2) il (3) ip (4) is (5) il (6)
i¡1 0.51 [0.00] 0.81 [0.00] 0.95 [0.00] 0.45 [0.00]
y¡1 0.42 [0.00] 0.27 [0.05]
y¡2 0.53 [0.00]
y¡4 -0.64 [0.00]
y¡5 -0.54 [0.00] -0.21 [0.00]
…¡1 -0.39 [0.06]
…¡3 0.47 [0.00]
…¡4 0.44 [0.03] 0.63 [0.02]
…¡5 0.34 [0.08]
y -1.20 [0.00]
y+4 -1.01 [0.00] -1.69 [0.02]
… 0.62 [0.00] 0.75 [0.01]
…+4 0.33 [0.13] 1.18 [0.00] 3.32 [0.00]
…+8 0.75 [0.00]
d12=00: eco. -0.21 [0.44] -0.40 [0.15] -0.31 [0.07] -0.02 [0.94] -0.60 [0.14] -0.51 [0.64]
d11=01: policy -0.45 [0.08] -0.16 [0.58] -0.03 [0.88] -0.57 [0.05] -1.85 [0.00] -2.81 [0.00]
EMU 0.49 [0.00] 0.36 [0.01] 0.48 [0.00] -0.04 [0.89] -0.64 [0.14] 0.28 [0.83]
normality 0.85 [0.65] 1.77 [0.41] 0.48 [0.79] 0.37 [0.83] 2.64 [0.27] 1.97 [0.37]
AR 1.37 [0.28] 0.51 [0.73] 1.16 [0.35] 2.30 [0.10] 1.77 [0.16] 1.00 [0.43]
ARCH 0.72 [0.59] 0.69 [0.60] 0.90 [0.48] 0.21 [0.93] 0.43 [0.79] 0.62 [0.65]
hetero 0.23 [0.99] 0.57 [0.83] 0.29 [0.92] 16.60 [0.48] 13.91 [0.24] 2.00 [0.11]
Wald 17.38 [0.00] 6.84 [0.08] 19.66 [0.00] 4.66 [0.20] 160.1 [0.00] 28.15 [0.00]
Sargan 15.71 [0.15] 20.32 [0.32] 14.36 [0.50]
s.e.e. 0.24 0.31 0.26 0.23 0.48 1.05
R2 0.95 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.93 0.42
Sample 1995(2)- 1993(1)- 1995(2)- 1995(2)- 1993(1)- 1995(2)-
2002(4) 2002(4) 2002(4) 2002(4) 2002(4) 2002(4)
Note: P-values are in brackets. The indicator variable EMU takes on the value 1 as
from 1999Q1. Additional instruments (besides the exogenous variables in the GUM) in (4):
Pt=¡1










18Table 3: European Central Bank (M)
backward looking forward looking
ip (1) is (2) il (3) ip (4) is (5) il (6)
c 0.80 [0.00] 0.24 [0.03]





i¡10 -0.16 [0.01] -0.19 [0.00] -0.22 [0.01]
i¡11 0.11 [0.25]
i¡12 0.22 [0.03]
i¡13 0.19 [0.00] -0.19 [0.01]
i¡14 0.28 [0.00]
y¡2 0.09 [0.00] 0.08 [0.00]
y¡3 0.03 [0.14]
y¡4 0.10 [0.00] 0.05 [0.06]
y¡6 -0.03 [0.17]
y¡7 -0.05 [0.02] -0.10 [0.00]
y¡9 -0.06 [0.00] 0.07 [0.00] -0.08 [0.00] 0.05 [0.05]
y¡11 0.03 [0.19]
y¡12 0.06 [0.04]
y¡14 -0.06 [0.00] -0.05 [0.02]
…¡2 0.19 [0.00]
…¡3 0.41 [0.00]
…¡4 -0.17 [0.02] 0.15 [0.02] -0.36 [0.00]
…¡7 -0.11 [0.12]
…¡10 0.16 [0.03] 0.20 [0.02] 0.24 [0.00] 0.35 [0.00]
…¡11 -0.31 [0.00] -0.39 [0.00]
…¡13 0.11 [0.08]
…¡14 0.20 [0.00]
…¡15 -0.17 [0.04] -0.27 [0.00]
19Table 3: European Central Bank (M) (continued)
backward looking forward looking
ip (1) is (2) il (3) ip (4) is (5) il (6)
y 0.10 [0.00]
…+12 0.20 [0.00]
…+24 -0.15 [0.02] -0.08 [0.24]
d12=00: eco. -0.12 [0.22] -0.22 [0.00] -0.09 [0.15] -0.26 [0.01] -0.11 [0.20] -0.09 [0.15]
d11=01: policy -0.03 [0.77] 0.00 [0.96] 0.01 [0.84] -0.08 [0.41] 0.10 [0.21] 0.01 [0.84]
EMU 0.13 [0.05] 0.13 [0.01] 0.15 [0.00] 0.21 [0.01] -0.12 [0.16] 0.15 [0.00]
normality 0.99 [0.61] 36.21 [0.00] 1.02 [0.60] 5.02 [0.08] 5.07 [0.08] 1.02 [0.60]
AR 2.13 [0.08] 0.49 [0.75] 0.60 [0.66] 1.90 [0.12] 0.29 [0.88] 0.60 [0.66]
ARCH 0.69 [0.60] 0.20 [0.94] 0.31 [0.87] 1.77 [0.14] 0.70 [0.60] 0.31 [0.87]
hetero 18.47 [0.49] 12.42 [0.96] 4.30 [0.51] 33.17 [0.27] 51.34 [0.24] 4.30 [0.51]
Wald 4.79 [0.19] 11.52 [0.01] 15.14 [0.00] 10.88 [0.01] 7.92 [0.05] 15.14 [0.00]
Sargan 52.19 [0.51] 33.69 [0.71] 69.14 [0.37]
s.e.e. 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.14 0.14 0.17
R2 0.97 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.98
Sample 1995(4)- 1993(1)- 1995(4)- 1995(4)- 1993(1)- 1995(4)-
2002(12) 2002(12) 2002(12) 2002(12) 2002(12) 2002(12)
Note: P-values are in brackets. The indicator variable EMU takes on the value 1 from



















20Table 4: Bank of Japan (Q)
backward looking forward looking
ip (1) is (2) il (3) ip(4) is (5) il (6)
c 0.31 [0.10]
i¡1 1.19 [0.00] 0.63 [0.00] 0.84 [0.00] 0.48 [0.00]
i¡2 -0.47 [0.00] -0.32 [0.06]
i¡3 0.53 [0.00]
i¡4 0.57 [0.00]
i¡5 0.14 [0.02] 0.23 [0.02] 0.25 [0.04] 0.21 [0.00] 0.39 [0.00]
y¡1 -0.57 [0.00]
y¡2 -0.10 [0.04] 0.45 [0.00]
y¡3 -0.66 [0.00] -0.18 [0.00]
y¡4 0.65 [0.00] -0.08 [0.04]
y¡5 -0.30 [0.01]
…¡2 0.27 [0.01] 0.24 [0.05]
y 0.49 [0.00]
y+4 -0.13 [0.04]
…+8 -0.34 [0.01] -0.10 [0.09] -0.25 [0.02]
d01=98: polit./proc. -0.14 [0.50] 0.02 [0.85] -0.05 [0.79] -0.06 [0.78] -0.19 [0.04] -0.24 [0.23]
d10=00: eco. 0.35 [0.19] -0.03 [0.74] 0.07 [0.80] 0.32 [0.21] -0.26 [0.14] 0.20 [0.47]
d03=01: oper. 0.00 [0.98] -0.01 [0.90] 0.18 [0.53] -0.31 [0.09] -0.17 [0.35] 0.11 [0.69]
normality 13.36 [0.00] 14.62 [0.00] 4.72 [0.09] 6.14 [0.05] 0.01 [0.99] 3.66 [0.16]
AR 3.23 [0.03] 0.62 [0.65] 0.88 [0.49] 1.80 [0.16] 1.99 [0.13] 1.03 [0.41]
ARCH 0.66 [0.63] 0.65 [0.63] 0.89 [0.48] 0.34 [0.84] 0.69 [0.61] 1.32 [0.29]
hetero 1.47 [0.22] 1.05 [0.44] 1.21 [0.33] 0.45 [0.89] 1.06 [0.46] 17.63 [0.09]
Wald 2.29 [0.51] 0.13 [0.99] 0.63 [0.89] 11.51 [0.01] 9.56 [0.02] 1.98 [0.58]
Sargan 13.50 [0.14] 12.54 [0.40] 23.74 [0.42]
s.e.e. 0.44 0.17 0.36 0.36 0.15 0.34
R2 0.88 0.97 0.92 0.94 0.98 0.93
Note: P-values are in brackets. Data period: 1993Q1-2002Q4. Additional instruments















21Table 5: Bank of Japan (M)
backward looking forward looking
ip (1) is (2) il (3) ip(4) is (5) il (6)
c -1.55 [0.00] 0.09 [0.15]
i¡1 0.46 [0.00] 1.06 [0.00] 1.03 [0.00] 0.71 [0.00] 0.98 [0.00] 1.01 [0.00]
i¡2 0.17 [0.07] 0.36 [0.06]
i¡3 -0.27 [0.00] 0.26 [0.18] -0.29 [0.00]
i¡4 -0.17 [0.00] -0.18 [0.09]
i¡5 0.29 [0.00] 0.04 [0.78] 0.25 [0.00]
i¡6 0.26 [0.00] 0.44 [0.02] 0.12 [0.34]
i¡7 -0.27 [0.00] 0.15 [0.39] -0.03 [0.79] -0.16 [0.01]
i¡8 -0.10 [0.21] -0.15 [0.39]
i¡9 -0.15 [0.41] -0.21 [0.02]
i¡10 0.20 [0.01] 0.24 [0.01] 0.30 [0.01] 0.19 [0.00]
i¡11 -0.27 [0.00] -0.26 [0.03] -0.09 [0.53] -0.07 [0.33]
i¡12 0.26 [0.00] 0.20 [0.02] 0.27 [0.09]
i¡13 -0.28 [0.00] -0.52 [0.00]
i¡14 0.11 [0.18] 0.11 [0.01]
y¡1 0.02 [0.01] -0.05 [0.00]
y¡2 -0.03 [0.56] 0.06 [0.00]
y¡5 -0.01 [0.12] -0.03 [0.00]
y¡6 0.01 [0.19]
y¡7 -0.04 [0.00] -0.12 [0.01] -0.04 [0.01]
y¡8
y¡9 0.07 [0.12]
y¡10 0.02 [0.01] 0.07 [0.12] 0.01 [0.44] -0.04 [0.01]
y¡11 0.05 [0.00] 0.07 [0.00]
y¡12 -0.06 [0.00] -0.02 [0.00]
y¡13 0.05 [0.01]
y¡14 -0.04 [0.00]
…¡1 0.03 [0.59] 0.11 [0.04]
…¡2 -0.11 [0.05] 0.10 [0.44]
…¡4
…¡6 0.06 [0.20] -0.12 [0.04] -0.08 [0.02]
22Table 5: Bank of Japan (M) (continued)
backward looking forward looking
ip (1) is (2) il (3) ip(4) is (5) il (6)
…¡7 0.17 [0.02] 0.02 [0.53]
…¡8 -0.05 [0.06] -0.16 [0.02] -0.05 [0.14]
…¡9 0.07 [0.00] 0.16 [0.00] -0.25 [0.04] 0.07 [0.01]
…¡11 0.17 [0.27]
…¡12 0.14 [0.47]
…¡13 0.08 [0.27] -0.13 [0.40]
…¡14 -0.09 [0.17] -0.07 [0.04] 0.00 [0.85]
y 0.12 [0.05]
y+12 0.13 [0.00] 0.01 [0.05]
… 0.45 [0.00]
…+12 0.26 [0.00] -0.02 [0.19] -0.06 [0.04]
…+24 0.60 [0.00] -0.07 [0.00] -0.08 [0.02]
d01=98: polit./proc. -0.03 [0.77] -0.03 [0.31] -0.00 [0.98] 1.64 [0.00] -0.12 [0.01] -0.13 [0.13]
d10=00: eco. 0.10 [0.45] 0.06 [0.17] 0.02 [0.85] 0.69 [0.06] 0.08 [0.21] -0.06 [0.58]
d03=01: oper. 0.00 [0.99] 0.01 [0.74] 0.04 [0.68] 0.45 [0.15] -0.06 [0.29] 0.04 [0.67]
normality 74.87 [0.00] 47.40 [0.00] 6.62 [0.04] 6.96 [0.03] 29.79 [0.00] 2.49 [0.29]
AR 0.49 [0.75] 0.51 [0.73] 0.64 [0.64] 1.46 [0.22] 0.88 [0.48] 0.81 [0.52]
ARCH 0.16 [0.96] 0.11 [0.98] 0.66 [0.62] 0.67 [0.62] 0.68 [0.61] 1.21 [0.31]
hetero 45.59 [0.03] 35.02 [0.05] 46.75 [0.13] 61.94 [0.14] 60.38 [0.03] 42.20 [0.05]
Wald 0.75 [0.86] 2.06 [0.56] 0.52 [0.92] 82.78 [0.00] 10.02 [0.02] 7.8 [0.05]
Sargan 1.56 [1.00] 64.13 [0.21] 85.28 [0.14]
s.e.e. 0.26 0.09 0.19 0.49 0.09 0.20
R2 0.95 0.99 0.98 0.85 0.99 0.98
Note: P-values are in brackets. Data period: 1993M1-2002M12. Additional instruments
















23Table 6: Reserve Bank of New Zealand (Q)
backward looking forward looking
ip(1) is(2) il(3) ip(4) is(5) il(6)
c 3.87 [0.00] 3.87 [0.00] 3.25 [0.00] 7.75 [0.00] 7.75 [0.00] 2.73 [0.01]
i¡1 0.85 [0.00] 0.85 [0.00] 0.84 [0.00] 0.66 [0.00]
i¡2 -0.38 [0.01] -0.38 [0.01] -0.36 [0.03]
y¡3 0.37 [0.00] 0.37 [0.00] 0.12 [0.08]
y¡5 -0.14 [0.04]
…¡2 0.24 [0.02]
y+4 0.36 [0.08] 0.36 [0.08] 0.21 [0.06]
… 0.82 [0.00] 0.82 [0.00]
…+4 -0.50 [0.00] -0.50 [0.00] -0.21 [0.03]
…+8 -0.72 [0.00] -0.72 [0.00]
d03=99: policy/oper. -0.63 [0.18] -0.63 [0.18] 0.13 [0.63] 0.16 [0.76] 0.16 [0.76] 0.33 [0.24]
d12=00: policy -0.13 [0.76] -0.13 [0.76] -0.69 [0.04] -1.91 [0.00] -1.91 [0.00] -0.40 [0.16]
normality 14.58 [0.00] 14.56 [0.00] 0.47 [0.79] 0.00 [1.00] 0.00 [1.00] 6.30 [0.04]
AR 0.30 [0.88] 0.30 [0.88] 2.71 [0.05] 2.36 [0.08] 2.36 [0.08] 1.59 [0.20]
ARCH 0.05 [1.00] 0.05 [1.00] 0.43 [0.78] 2.51 [0.07] 2.49 [0.07] 0.19 [0.94]
hetero 0.63 [0.75] 0.63 [0.75] 2.34 [0.05] 1.93 [0.10] 1.92 [0.10] 0.90 [0.53]
Wald 4.36 [0.11] 4.36 [0.11] 6.39 [0.04] 18.83 [0.00] 18.83 [0.00] 2.22 [0.33]
Sargan 30.38 [0.06] 30.39 [0.06] 22.51 [0.26]
s.e.e. 0.77 0.77 0.49 0.98 0.98 0.53
R2 0.83 0.83 0.73 0.74 0.74 0.66
Note: P-values are in brackets. Data period: 1993Q1-2002Q4. Additional instruments
















24Table 7: Swedisch Riksbank (Q)
backward looking forward looking
ip(1) is(2) il (3) ip (4) is (5) il (6)
i¡1 0.82 [0.00] 0.84 [0.00] 1.27 [0.00] 0.85 [0.00] 0.87 [0.00] 0.67 [0.00]
i¡2 -0.37 [0.01]
i¡5 0.18 [0.02]
y¡1 0.34 [0.00] 0.34 [0.00]
y¡4 -0.25 [0.00] -0.25 [0.00] 0.41 [0.05]
y¡5 -0.66 [0.00]
…¡1 0.32 [0.00] 0.31 [0.00]
…¡3 0.32 [0.00]
…¡4 -0.18 [0.02] -0.16 [0.03]
…¡5 0.23 [0.00] 0.18 [0.01]
y 0.39 [0.00] 0.35 [0.00]
y+4 0.16 [0.09] 0.30 [0.00]
… 0.39 [0.00] 0.37 [0.00] 0.34 [0.01]
…+4 0.13 [0.14] 0.33 [0.03]
…+8 -0.51 [0.00]
d03=97: economic 0.60 [0.01] 0.57 [0.01] 0.30 [0.19] 0.68 [0.00] 0.57 [0.00] 0.59 [0.07]
d01=99: political -0.39 [0.08] -0.38 [0.06] 0.82 [0.02] -1.00 [0.00] -1.11 [0.00] 1.08 [0.03]
d10=99: eco./policy 0.11 [0.77] 0.09 [0.80] -0.91 [0.13] -0.18 [0.63] -0.02 [0.94] -0.21 [0.74]
d03=00: oper. -0.13 [0.74] -0.13 [0.72] 0.04 [0.95] -0.21 [0.54] 0.13 [0.64] -0.81 [0.21]
d03=02: proc./policy -0.15 [0.52] -0.07 [0.74] -0.60 [0.09] 0.44 [0.02] 0.48 [0.01] -0.73 [0.13]
normality 3.67 [0.16] 0.83 [0.66] 6.55 [0.04] 3.66 [0.16] 0.65 [0.72] 1.22 [0.54]
AR 2.91 [0.04] 4.13 [0.01] 2.10 [0.11] 2.20 [0.10] 2.14 [0.10] 1.45 [0.25]
ARCH 0.53 [0.72] 1.16 [0.36] 1.65 [0.20] 0.20 [0.94] 0.46 [0.77] 0.22 [0.92]
hetero 0.72 [0.74] 0.93 [0.57] 0.71 [0.72] 1.01 [0.50] 1.29 [0.30] 0.29 [0.99]
Wald 14.72 [0.01] 13.25 [0.01] 12.75 [0.03] 34.58 [0.00] 47.19 [0.00] 11.92 [0.04]
Sargan 29.79 [0.07] 18.29 [0.31] 26.48 [0.09]
s.e.e. 0.31 0.28 0.50 0.28 0.26 0.52
R2 0.98 0.99 0.95 0.99 0.99 0.96
Note: P-values are in brackets. Data period: 1993Q1-2002Q4. Additional instruments





















25Table 8: Swedisch Riksbank (M)
backward looking forward looking
ip(1) is(2) il (3) ip (4) is (5) il (6)
c 0.24 [0.01] 0.93 [0.00]
i¡1 1.23 [0.00] 1.46 [0.00] 1.07 [0.00] 0.99 [0.00] 1.36 [0.00] 1.06 [0.00]
i¡2 -0.20 [0.00] -0.51 [0.00]
i¡3 -0.53 [0.00]
i¡4 -0.11 [0.00] 0.04 [0.00] -0.18 [0.00]
i¡5 -0.02 [0.00] 0.01 [0.00]
i¡6 0.02 [0.00]
i¡7 -0.01 [0.01] 0.01 [0.00]







i¡15 0.02 [0.00] 0.01 [0.00]
y¡1 0.01 [0.05]
y¡3 0.01 [0.00] 0.03 [0.00]




y¡9 0.02 [0.00] -0.02 [0.04]
y¡12 0.01 [0.00] 0.02 [0.00] 0.01 [0.04]
y¡13 0.01 [0.00] -0.03 [0.00] 0.01 [0.07] -0.03 [0.00]
y¡14 0.02 [0.02] 0.02 [0.01]
y¡15 -0.02 [0.00] -0.01 [0.09] -0.01 [0.05]
…¡1 -0.18 [0.00]
…¡2 0.07 [0.00] 0.06 [0.00]
…¡3 -0.09 [0.05]
…¡4 0.17 [0.00]
…¡5 -0.07 [0.01] -0.15 [0.00]
26Table 8: Swedisch Riksbank (M) (continued)
backward looking forward looking
ip(1) is(2) il (3) ip (4) is (5) il (6)
…¡7 -0.11 [0.00]











…+24 -0.05 [0.04] -0.07 [0.02]
d03=97: economic 0.03 [0.48] -0.05 [0.28] 0.05 [0.45] 0.01 [0.82] -0.01 [0.90] -0.36 [0.01]
d01=99: political 0.01 [0.83] -0.04 [0.43] 0.36 [0.00] 0.05 [0.52] 0.50 [0.00] 0.22 [0.05]
d10=99: econ./policy 0.13 [0.15] 0.09 [0.19] -0.19 [0.13] 0.20 [0.04] 0.28 [0.00] -0.16 [0.19]
d03=00: operational -0.19 [0.02] -0.14 [0.02] -0.11 [0.35] -0.21 [0.02] -0.05 [0.58] -0.19 [0.10]
d03=02: proc./policy -0.00 [0.99] 0.00 [0.99] -0.28 [0.00] 0.14 [0.07] -0.42 [0.00] -0.05 [0.61]
normality 10.05 [0.01] 3.29 [0.19] 2.57 [0.28] 4.30 [0.12] 6.47 [0.04] 2.29 [0.32]
AR 1.34 [0.26] 1.88 [0.12] 0.29 [0.88] 0.76 [0.55] 2.88 [0.03] 1.84 [0.13]
ARCH 0.20 [0.94] 1.88 [0.12] 0.71 [0.59] 0.39 [0.81] 0.38 [0.82] 0.22 [0.93]
hetero 17.09 [0.88] 32.45 [0.03] 32.63 [0.09] 20.07 [0.64] 54.25 [0.58] 46.33 [0.14]
Wald 6.51 [0.26]12.73 [0.03]26.12 [0.00]19.32 [0.00]100.5 [0.00] 39.02 [0.00]
Sargan 83.94 [0.20] 32.86 [0.84] 40.26 [0.55]
s.e.e. 0.15 0.11 0.22 0.16 0.15 0.20
R2 0.96 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.99
Note: P-values are in brackets. Data period: 1993M1-2002M12. Additional instruments





















27Table 9: Swiss National Bank (Q)
backward looking forward looking
ip (1) is (2) il (3) ip (4) is (5) il (6)
c 0.92 [0.00] 0.79 [0.00] 1.42 [0.00] 1.04 [0.00] 1.54 [0.00] 1.42 [0.00]
i¡1 0.95 [0.00] 0.36 [0.01] 0.72 [0.00]
i¡4 -0.36 [0.00]
y¡1 0.32 [0.05] 0.31 [0.02]
y¡2 -0.42 [0.01] 0.21 [0.06] -0.20 [0.09]
y¡5 -0.29 [0.00]
…¡2 0.20 [0.07] 0.26 [0.00] 0.27 [0.03] 0.18 [0.01]
…¡4 0.39 [0.00]
…¡5 0.47 [0.00]
y 0.62 [0.00] 0.87 [0.00]
y+4 0.18 [0.01] 0.16 [0.03]
… 0.33 [0.01] 0.61 [0.00]
…+4 0.24 [0.04]
…+8 -0.27 [0.03] -0.44 [0.00] -0.47 [0.00]
d12=99: polit./ 0.13 [0.46] 0.38 [0.01] -0.39 [0.01] -0.94 [0.00] -1.48 [0.00] -0.50 [0.01]
eco./oper.
normality 0.09 [0.96] 1.31 [0.52] 2.06 [0.36] 0.25 [0.88] 0.65 [0.72] 0.41 [0.81]
AR 1.10 [0.37] 0.96 [0.44] 0.81 [0.53] 2.00 [0.12] 0.33 [0.86] 1.27 [0.31]
ARCH 0.13 [0.97] 0.81 [0.53] 0.55 [0.70] 0.51 [0.73] 1.04 [0.41] 1.19 [0.34]
hetero 6.89 [0.44] 3.74 [0.81] 12.98 [0.07] 0.68 [0.77] 0.44 [0.93] 1.06 [0.45]
Wald 0.57 [0.45] 7.73 [0.01] 8.60 [0.00] 16.01 [0.00] 47.3 [0.00] 6.99 [0.01]
Sargan 30.29 [0.09] 22.75 [0.06] 13.26 [0.51]
s.e.e. 0.42 0.39 0.29 0.33 0.38 0.31
R2 0.89 0.92 0.88 0.95 0.93 0.87
Note: P-values are in brackets. Data period: 1993Q1-2002Q4. Additional instruments


















28Table 10: Bank of England (Q)
backward looking forward looking
ip (1) is (2) il (3) ip (4) is (5) il (6)
c 4.61 [0.00] 3.39 [0.00] -7.50 [0.03]
i¡1 1.59 [0.00] 0.91 [0.00] 0.72 [0.00]
i¡2 -0.64 [0.00] -0.39 [0.01] -0.31 [0.05] -0.42 [0.01] -0.50 [0.00]
i¡3 -0.51 [0.00] 0.44 [0.00]
i¡4 0.44 [0.00]
i¡5 -0.36 [0.02] 0.73 [0.00]
y¡1 -0.73 [0.01]
y¡2 0.38 [0.01] 0.54 [0.01]
y¡3 -0.39 [0.00]
y¡4 -0.22 [0.30] -1.20 [0.00] -0.67 [0.01]
y¡5 0.29 [0.10]
…¡1 -0.33 [0.07] 1.25 [0.00]
…¡2 0.41 [0.01] 0.46 [0.00]
…¡3 0.78 [0.00] -0.09 [0.32]
…¡4 -0.53 [0.00] 1.22 [0.00]
…¡5 1.05 [0.00]
y 0.80 [0.00] 0.55 [0.00]
y+4 0.66 [0.09] -0.31 [0.06]
… 1.23 [0.00] 2.02 [0.00]
…+4 0.77 [0.03] 0.51 [0.00]
…+8 -0.18 [0.05] 0.66 [0.04]
d06=97: polit. -0.02 [0.91] 1.37 [0.00] -1.00 [0.00] 0.16 [0.34] 1.11 [0.02] -1.08 [0.00]
d04=99: eco. -0.29 [0.40] -0.99 [0.16] 0.21 [0.68] -0.32 [0.37] -0.49 [0.63] 0.70 [0.08]
d08=99: oper. -0.21 [0.56] 0.11 [0.88] -0.44 [0.33] 0.00 [0.99] 1.73 [0.04] 0.03 [0.94]
normality 7.30 [0.03] 0.54 [0.76] 2.59 [0.27] 0.38 [0.83] 1.42 [0.49] 0.07 [0.97]
AR 2.52 [0.07] 0.34 [0.85] 1.84 [0.15] 1.36 [0.27] 0.60 [0.67] 0.62 [0.65]
ARCH 0.14 [0.96] 1.85 [0.16] 1.94 [0.13] 0.18 [0.95] 0.70 [0.60] 0.34 [0.85]
hetero 0.65 [0.79] 0.50 [0.90] 2.39 [0.04] 23.87 [0.20] 0.37 [0.97] 0.45 [0.93]
Wald 8.04 [0.05] 17.3 [0.00] 17.35 [0.00] 2.55 [0.47] 12.5 [0.01] 35.47 [0.00]
Sargan 14.53 [0.75] 13.59 [0.70] 29.96 [0.05]
s.e.e. 0.29 0.61 0.40 0.29 0.73 0.30
R2 0.93 0.79 0.94 0.93 0.69 0.97
Note: P-values are in brackets. Data period: 1993Q1-2002Q4. Additional instruments





















30Table 11: Bank of England (M)
backward looking forward looking
ip (1) is (2) il (3) ip (4) is (5) il (6)
c 0.44 [0.01] 0.87 [0.04] -2.76 [0.04]
i¡1 0.99 [0.00] 0.30 [0.00] 0.91 [0.00] 0.92 [0.00] 0.23 [0.02] 0.83 [0.00]
i¡2 0.20 [0.06] 0.27 [0.00] 0.32 [0.00]
i¡4 -0.27 [0.00]
i¡5 -0.17 [0.04] -0.19 [0.00]
i¡9 -0.17 [0.05]
i¡10 0.15 [0.09] 0.11 [0.00]




y¡5 0.06 [0.00] 0.08 [0.00]
y¡6 0.06 [0.04]
y¡8 -0.00 [0.09]
y¡9 -0.05 [0.01] -0.10 [0.17]
y¡12 0.11 [0.16]
…¡1 0.55 [0.00]
…¡4 0.70 [0.00] 0.71 [0.00]
…¡5 -0.56 [0.00] -0.72 [0.00]
…¡10 0.16 [0.01]
…¡11 -0.22 [0.01]
…¡12 -0.45 [0.03] 0.17 [0.02] -0.35 [0.13]
…¡13 0.63 [0.00] 0.58 [0.01]
…¡14 -0.13 [0.03] -0.22 [0.00]
…¡15 0.13 [0.04] 0.16 [0.01]
y 0.05 [0.02] 0.09 [0.28] 0.07 [0.01]
… 0.25 [0.00] 0.65 [0.00]
…+12 0.05 [0.01] 0.26 [0.08] 0.14 [0.00]
…+24 0.30 [0.01]
31Table 11: Bank of England (M) (continued)
backward looking forward looking
ip (1) is (2) il (3) ip (4) is (5) il (6)
d06=97: polit. 0.04 [0.39] 0.12 [0.43] -0.33 [0.00] 0.11 [0.04] 0.54 [0.01] -0.17 [0.26]
d04=99: eco. -0.02 [0.87] -0.05 [0.87] 0.18 [0.23] 0.00 [0.96] 0.01 [0.98] 0.26 [0.01]
d08=99: oper. -0.11 [0.21] 0.04 [0.90] -0.18 [0.18] -0.09 [0.30] -0.00 [1.00] -0.14 [0.00]
normality 2.66 [0.26] 13.35 [0.00] 1.06 [0.59] 0.10 [0.95] 14.41 [0.00] 0.71 [0.70]
AR 1.36 [0.25] 0.84 [0.50] 0.37 [0.83] 0.84 [0.51] 0.80 [0.53] 0.60 [0.66]
ARCH 0.37 [0.83] 7.13 [0.00] 1.51 [0.20] 1.12 [0.35] 1.91 [0.11] 1.05 [0.38]
hetero 22.86 [0.15] 34.38 [0.03] 21.68 [0.03] 31.82 [0.33] 47.81 [0.03] 21.29 [0.07]
Wald 5.28 [0.15] 1.14 [0.77] 11.23 [0.01] 5.88 [0.12] 8.2 [0.04] 9.07 [0.03]
Sargan 83.33 [0.19] 57.04 [0.87] 90.97 [0.19]
s.e.e. 0.16 0.53 0.24 0.14 0.51 0.23
R2 0.97 0.77 0.97 0.98 0.80 0.98
Note: P-values are in brackets. Data period: 1993M1-2002M4. Additional instruments,





















32Table 12: Federal Reserve (Q)
backward looking forward looking
ip(1) is(2) il(3) ip(4) is(5) il(6)
c 1.08 [0.12] 1.77 [0.00] 4.47 [0.01] 0.87 [0.00]
i¡1 1.19 [0.00] 0.96 [0.00] 0.62 [0.00] 0.89 [0.00]
i¡2 -0.26 [0.42]
i¡3 -0.12 [0.68] -0.25 [0.01] -0.31 [0.03]
i¡4 -0.27 [0.36]
i¡5 0.27 [0.20] -0.39 [0.03] -0.98 [0.00]
y¡1 0.25 [0.12] 0.19 [0.10]
y¡2 0.10 [0.62] 0.58 [0.05]
y¡3 -0.27 [0.15] -0.21 [0.03] 0.60 [0.02]




…¡3 0.26 [0.30] 0.53 [0.02]
…¡4 0.06 [0.86] 2.98 [0.00]
…¡5 -0.47 [0.09] -0.26 [0.06] -0.44 [0.04] -0.93 [0.02]
y 0.47 [0.00] 0.38 [0.00] -0.77 [0.02]
y+4 -0.23 [0.00] 0.73 [0.00]
… 1.61 [0.00]
…+4 0.22 [0.00] 0.19 [0.01] 1.30 [0.00]
d02=94: policy 0.50 [0.08] 0.42 [0.06] 0.29 [0.33] 0.10 [0.57] 0.22 [0.29] 2.83 [0.00]
d05=99: policy -0.53 [0.06] -0.58 [0.00] -0.90 [0.01] -0.33 [0.02] -0.38 [0.02] -1.67 [0.00]
normality 5.31 [0.07] 2.28 [0.32] 0.23 [0.89] 2.56 [0.28] 1.30 [0.52] 1.52 [0.47]
AR 0.91 [0.48] 1.17 [0.35] 1.14 [0.36] 2.34 [0.08] 0.27 [0.89] 2.03 [0.13]
ARCH 0.35 [0.84] 0.60 [0.67] 1.41 [0.26] 0.31 [0.87] 1.52 [0.22] 0.11 [0.98]
hetero 29.98 [0.27] 13.99 [0.17] 8.26 [0.60] 1.22 [0.33] 0.93 [0.52] 29.89 [0.37]
Wald 4.79 [0.09] 10.37 [0.01] 8.58 [0.01] 7.09 [0.03] 5.91 [0.05] 74.82 [0.00]
Sargan 23.69 [0.26] 21.26 [0.17] 4.65 [0.99]
s.e.e. 0.32 0.34 0.50 0.27 0.30 0.40
R2 0.97 0.95 0.76 0.97 0.95 0.88
Note: P-values are in brackets. Data period: 1993Q1-2002Q4. Additional instruments



















33Table 13: Federal Reserve (M)
backward looking forward looking
ip(1) is(2) il(3) ip(4) is(5) il(6)
c 0.48 [0.01] 0.39 [0.03] -1.69 [0.00]
i¡1 1.05 [0.00] 1.12 [0.00] 0.98 [0.00] 0.72 [0.00] 0.95 [0.00] 0.91 [0.00]
i¡2 -0.16 [0.17]
i¡3 0.16 [0.07]
i¡4 -0.22 [0.03] -0.08 [0.42] -0.14 [0.08]
i¡6 0.33 [0.00] 0.22 [0.02] 0.17 [0.13] 0.28 [0.00]
i¡7 0.07 [0.56]
i¡8 -0.29 [0.01] -0.12 [0.32] -0.13 [0.27] -0.17 [0.00]
i¡9 0.25 [0.06] 0.13 [0.34] 0.15 [0.19]
i¡10 -0.16 [0.10] -0.24 [0.04] -0.29 [0.01]
i¡11 0.16 [0.08]





y¡3 0.04 [0.42] 0.06 [0.10]
y¡5 -0.06 [0.12] -0.07 [0.06] -0.08 [0.01]
y¡6 -0.08 [0.01] 0.11 [0.03]
y¡7 0.06 [0.20] -0.12 [0.02]
y¡8 -0.03 [0.51] -0.09 [0.04]




y¡14 0.05 [0.24] 0.07 [0.02]
y¡15 0.03 [0.45]
…¡1 0.09 [0.09]
…¡2 0.18 [0.01] 0.14 [0.00]
…¡3 -0.31 [0.01] -0.13 [0.03]
…¡4 0.11 [0.22]
…¡5 -0.23 [0.03]
…¡6 0.07 [0.28] 0.41 [0.00]
34Table 13: Federal Reserve (M) (continued)
backward looking forward looking
ip(1) is(2) il(3) ip(4) is(5) il(6)




…¡15 -0.27 [0.00] -0.17 [0.01]
y 0.13 [0.00] 0.09 [0.00]
y+12 0.04 [0.04] 0.07 [0.00]
…+12 0.21 [0.00] 0.08 [0.00] 0.09 [0.03]
…+24 0.13 [0.01] -0.04 [0.02]
d02=94: policy 0.04 [0.67] 0.06 [0.50] 0.10 [0.20] 0.20 [0.00] 0.21 [0.01] 0.24 [0.00]
d05=99: policy -0.15 [0.02] -0.16 [0.03] -0.05 [0.40] -0.13 [0.03] -0.20 [0.00] -0.14 [0.01]
normality 55.32 [0.00] 4.85 [0.09] 0.03 [0.98] 6.52 [0.01] 6.95 [0.03] 1.54 [0.46]
AR 1.14 [0.34] 0.37 [0.83] 2.08 [0.09] 1.10 [0.36] 1.55 [0.19] 2.26 [0.07]
ARCH 0.59 [0.67] 0.99 [0.42] 1.18 [0.33] 0.75 [0.56] 1.03 [0.39] 0.47 [0.76]
hetero 47.83 [0.25] 45.94 [0.56] 6.23 [0.18] 49.39 [0.04] 33.79 [0.09] 16.15 [0.58]
Wald 6.91 [0.03] 6.46 [0.04] 1.74 [0.42] 9.33 [0.01] 14.73 [0.00] 10.11 [0.01]
Sargan 70.87 [0.16] 77.27 [0.41] 94.13 [0.10]
s.e.e. 0.16 0.15 0.27 0.15 0.15 0.24
R2 0.99 0.99 0.91 0.99 0.99 0.93
Note: P-values are in brackets. Data period: 1993M1-2002M12. Additional instruments,






















35Tabel 14: Summary of backward looking results
ip is il Flexibility Reputation
RBA
d10=01: economic -0.94 [0.01] -0.43 [0.06] 0.46 [0.25] + 0
ECB
d12=00: economic -0.21 [0.44] -0.40 [0.15] -0.31 [0.07] 0 +
d11=01: policy -0.45 [0.08] -0.16 [0.58] -0.03 [0.88] + 0
EMU 0.49 [0.00] 0.36 [0.01] 0.48 [0.00] - -
BoJ
d01=98: political/proc. -0.14 [0.50] 0.02 [0.85] -0.05 [0.79] 0 0
d10=00: economic 0.35 [0.19] -0.03 [0.74] 0.07 [0.80] 0 0
d03=01: operational 0.00 [0.98] -0.01 [0.90] 0.18 [0.53] 0 0
RBNZ
d03=99: policy/oper. -0.63 [0.18] -0.63 [0.18] 0.13 [0.63] 0 0
d12=00: policy -0.13 [0.76] -0.13 [0.76] -0.69 [0.04] 0 +
SRB
d03=97: economic 0.60 [0.01] 0.57 [0.01] 0.30 [0.19] - 0
d01=99: political -0.39 [0.08] -0.38 [0.06] 0.82 [0.02] + -
d10=99: econ/policy 0.11 [0.77] 0.09 [0.80] -0.91 [0.13] 0 0
d03=00: operational -0.13 [0.74] -0.13 [0.72] 0.04 [0.95] 0 0
d03=02: proc/policy -0.15 [0.52] -0.07 [0.74] -0.60 [0.09] 0 +
SNB
d12=99: polit./econ./oper. 0.13 [0.46] 0.38 [0.01] -0.39 [0.01] - +
BoE
d06=97: political -0.02 [0.91] 1.37 [0.00] -1.00 [0.00] - +
d04=99: economic -0.29 [0.40] -0.99 [0.16] 0.21 [0.68] 0 0
d08=99: operational -0.21 [0.56] 0.11 [0.88] -0.44 [0.33] 0 0
Fed
d02=94: policy 0.50 [0.08] 0.42 [0.06] 0.29 [0.33] - 0
d05=99: policy -0.53 [0.06] -0.58 [0.00] -0.90 [0.01] + +
Note: Coe¢cient estimates for transparency indicators dMM=YY reported in Tables 1, 2, 4, 6, 7,
9, 10 and 12, with p-values in brackets. The additional EMU indicator for the ECB turns on
in January 1999. The last two columns indicate whether the increase in transparency appears
to improve (+), reduce (–) or has no e¤ect (0) on ‡exibility and reputation.
36Table 15: Summary of forward looking results
ip is il Flexibility Reputation
RBA
d10=01: economic -0.65 [0.00] -0.54 [0.00] -0.25 [0.38] + 0
ECB
d12=00: economic -0.02 [0.94] -0.60 [0.14] -0.51 [0.64] 0 0
d11=01: policy -0.57 [0.05] -1.85 [0.00] -2.81 [0.00] + +
EMU -0.04 [0.89] -0.64 [0.14] 0.28 [0.83] 0 0
BoJ
d01=98: political/proc. -0.06 [0.78] -0.19 [0.04] -0.24 [0.23] + 0
d10=00: economic 0.32 [0.21] -0.26 [0.14] 0.20 [0.47] 0 0
d03=01: operational -0.31 [0.09] -0.17 [0.35] 0.11 [0.69] + 0
RBNZ
d03=99: policy/oper. 0.16 [0.76] 0.16 [0.76] 0.33 [0.24] 0 0
d12=00: policy -1.91 [0.00] -1.91 [0.00] -0.40 [0.16] + 0
SRB
d03=97: economic 0.68 [0.00] 0.57 [0.00] 0.59 [0.07] - -
d01=99: political -1.00 [0.00] -1.11 [0.00] 1.08 [0.03] + -
d10=99: econ/policy -0.18 [0.63] -0.02 [0.94] -0.21 [0.74] 0 0
d03=00: operational -0.21 [0.54] 0.13 [0.64] -0.81 [0.21] 0 0
d03=02: proc/policy 0.44 [0.02] 0.48 [0.01] -0.73 [0.13] - 0
SNB
d12=99: polit./econ./oper. -0.94 [0.00] -1.48 [0.00] -0.50 [0.01] + +
BoE
d06=97: political 0.16 [0.34] 1.11 [0.02] -1.08 [0.00] - +
d04=99: economic -0.32 [0.37] -0.49 [0.63] 0.70 [0.08] 0 -
d08=99: operational 0.00 [0.99] 1.73 [0.04] 0.03 [0.94] - 0
Fed
d02=94: policy 0.10 [0.57] 0.22 [0.29] 2.83 [0.00] 0 -
d05=99: policy -0.33 [0.02] -0.38 [0.02] -1.67 [0.00] + +
Note: Coe¢cient estimates for transparency indicators dMM=YY reported in Tables 1, 2, 4, 6,
7, 9, 10 and 12, with p-values in brackets. The additional EMU indicator for the ECB turns
on January 1999. The last two columns indicate whether the increase in transparency appears
to improve (+), reduce (–) or has no e¤ect (0) on ‡exibility and reputation.
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39A Appendix
This appendix provides details about the variables used in the empirical analysis, namely
the transparency indicators dMM=YY and the macroeconomic data used for the interest
rates ip, is and il, in‡ation …, and the output gap y. In addition we present the regressions
results to test robustness.
A.1 Transparency Indicators
This section contains a detailed description of the transparency indicators dMM=Y Y that
represent changes in transparency according to the Eij¢nger and Geraats (2004) index
for each central bank from 1998 to 2002. In square brackets is (in reverse order) the date
of change, the change in the index score, and the aspect it pertains to: (1) political, (2)
economic, (3) procedural, (4) policy, and (5) operational.
In addition, a few events outside the 1998-2002 sample of Eij¢nger and Geraats (2004)
have been included (BoJ d01=98, SRB d03=97, ....) as they would clearly e¤ect transparency
scores.
Finally, several transparency indicators (ECB d12=00; RBNZ d03=99; SRB d10=99 and
d03=02; SNB d12=99) capture multiple changes in the transparency scores to avoid exact
multicollinearity.
Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA)
¢ d10=01: [(2) +1, 10/2001] The speech “The Monetary Policy Process at the RBA”
by Glenn Stevens, Assistant Governor, Melbourne, October 10, 2001 (available from
http://www.rba.gov.au) clari…es that the Reserve Bank uses the following macroeco-
nomic model for policy analysis: Meredith Beechey, Nargis Bharucha, Adam Cagliarini,
David Gruen, Christopher Thompson, “Asmall model of the Australian macro economy”,
Reserve Bank of Australia Research Discussion Paper 2000-05.
European Central Bank (ECB)
¢ d12=00: [(2) +0.5, 12/2000] Since December 2000, conditional in‡ation and output
projections for the medium term have been published twice a year in the June and
December Monthly Bulletin.
[(2) +1, 1/2001] Publication of a structural macroeconomic model used by the ECB for
policy analysis: G. Fagan, J. Henry and R. Metez, “An Area-Wide Model (AWM) for
the Euro Area”, European Central Bank Working Paper 42, January 2001.
¢ d11=01: [(4) +0.5, 11/2001] Since November 2001, monetary policy meetings of
the Governing Council have taken place once a month, followed by a press conference
in which the President provides an introductory statement with an explanation of the
40policy decision. Before that, there were two policy meetings every month, only the …rst
of which was followed by such a press conference.
Bank of Japan (BoJ)
¢ d01=98: [(1) and (3) +?, 01/1998] An amendment of the Bank of Japan Law speci…es
that monetary policy “shall be aimed at, through the pursuit of price stability, contribut-
ing to the sound development of the national economy” (Art. 2), it a¢rms the autonomy
of the Bank of Japan over monetary policy (Art. 3.1) and increases its e¤ective inde-
pendence. In addition, the Bank is required to be transparent about “the content of its
decisions, as well as its decision making process” (Art. 3.2), and in particular, publish
the minutes and transcripts of the monetary policy meetings of the Policy Board (Art.
20) and submit a semi-annual report on monetary policy to the Diet (Art. 54.1). The
amendment entered into force April 1, 1998, but the regular monetary policy meetings
by the Policy Board and the publication of minutes started in January 1998.
¢ d10=00: [(2) +0.5, 10/2000] Starting in October 2000, the semiannual Outlook and
Risk Assessment of the Economy and Prices contains short-term conditional forecasts
for in‡ation and output by the Policy Board.
¢ d03=01: [(5) -0.5, 3/2001] On March 19, 2001 the main operating target was changed
from the average uncollateralized overnight call rate (which has been e¤ectively zero since
February 12, 1999) to the outstanding balance of the current accounts at the Bank. In
contrast to the previous target, it is a very rough range and the targeted variable shows
signi…cant ‡uctuations within it, but there are no explanations for these control errors.
Note that d03=01 is the only indicator that solely pertains to a reduction in transparency.
To facilitate the interpretation of the results, d03=01 changes from 1 to 0 on 03=01, so that
d03=01 still captures the e¤ect of transparency.
Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ)
¢ d03=99: [(4) +1.5, 3/1999] Initially, there were no explanations of formal policy
decisions, but after the introduction of the O¢cial Cash Rate in March 1999, explanations
were provided in case of policy changes (see http://www.rbnz.govt.nz). In addition, since
March 1999 the quarterly Monetary Policy Statement has included three-year ahead
unconditional projections for the 90-day bank bill rate, which is very closely related to
the O¢cial Cash Rate and therefore serves as a policy inclination.
[(5) +1, 3/1999] Initially, when the daily settlement cash target was the formal operating
target, there was no evaluation of its achievement, causing opacity about control errors.
In March 1999, the main operating target was changed to the O¢cial Cash Rate, which
is nearly perfectly controlled (e.g. see Andy Brookes and Tim Hampton, ‘The O¢cial
Cash Rate one year on’, Reserve Bank Bulletin, June 2000).
¢ d12=00: [(4) +0.5, 12/2000] Since December 2000, explanations for policy decisions
41have also been provided when it was decided not to adjust the O¢cial Cash Rate (see
http://www.rbnz.govt.nz).
Note that one event has not been included due to considerable uncertainty about
the precise timing, namely: [(2) +0.5, 2002?] Data on capacity utilization have become
publicly available in Excel spreadsheets that accompany the quarterly Monetary Policy
Statements on the web site (http://www.rbnz.govt.nz), at least since June 2002.
Swedish Riksbank (SRB)
¢ d03=97: [(2) +1, 03/1997] Publication of in‡ation forecasts in the quarterly In‡ation
Report since March 1997.
¢ d01=99: [(1) +1, 1/1999] Amendments (e¤ective from January 1999) to the Constitu-
tion Act and the Sveriges Riksbank Act clarify the Riksbank’s institutional independence
and main objective. In particular, “The Riksbank is responsible for monetary policy.
No authority may determine the decisions made by the Riksbank on issues relating to
monetary policy.” Constitution Act, Chapter 9, Art. 12; “Members of the Executive
Board may not seek nor take instructions when they are ful…lling their monetary policy
duties.” Sveriges Riksbank Act, Chapter 3, Art. 2; and, “The objective of the Riksbank’s
operations shall be to maintain price stability. In addition, the Riksbank shall promote
a safe and e¢cient payment system.” Sveriges Riksbank Act, Chapter 1, Art. 2.
¢ d10=99: [(4) +0.5, 10/1999] Starting in October 1999, the announcement of every
policy decision is accompanied by an explanation, whereas previously this was only the
case for adjustments in the policy instrument.
[(2) +0.5, 12/1999] Since December 1999, data on many economic variables, including
capacity utilization (in the form of econometric estimates of the output gap), have become
available for downloading from the Riksbank web site (http://www.riksbank.com) in
Excel spreadsheets accompanying the quarterly In‡ation Report.
¢ d03=00: [(5) +1, 3/2000] Beginning in 2000, the March In‡ation Report includes a
discussion of past in‡ation forecast errors, revealing macroeconomic transmission distur-
bances, and an evaluation of the in‡ation outcome over the last three years, including an
account of the contribution of monetary policy.
¢ d03=02: [(4) +1, 3/2002] A policy inclination indicating the likely adjustment of
interest rate in the near future was …rst provided at the announcement of the policy
decision in March 2002.
[(3) +1, 5/2002] Initially, the minutes sometimes noted attributed reservations against
the policy decision, but it was not clear whether these were (the only) dissents. This
was clari…ed in May 2002, so that the minutes now e¤ectively provide attributed voting
records.
Swiss National Bank (SNB)
42¢ d12=99: [(1) +1, 12/1999] A quantitative de…nition of price stability was speci…ed
in December 1999, namely an in‡ation rate as measured by the national consumer price
index of less than 2 % per annum.
[(2) +0.5, 12/1999] Since December 1999, an in‡ation forecast for the three ensuing
years has been presented in the June and December Quarterly Bulletin (in French and
German only) and at the half-yearly media news conference (in English).
[(5) -0.5, 12/1999] Initially, a graphical evaluation of monetary targets was included
in the Annual Report with an explanation of deviations. From December 1999 on, the
operational target range of 100 basis points for the three-month LIBOR rate has been
graphically evaluated in Annual Report, but without explanations for control errors in
the form of signi…cant ‡uctuations within this range.
[(1) +0.5, 1/2000] A constitutional amendment, e¤ective from January 2000, enshrines
the Bank’s independence: “As an independent central bank, the Swiss National Bank
shall pursue a monetary policy serving the interests of the country as a whole”, Federal
Constitution Art. 99(2).
Bank of England (BoE)
¢ d06=97: [(1) +?, 1997] The Bank of England (BoE) was granted operational inde-
pendence in 1997 and the …rst interest rate decision by the independent Monetary Policy
Committee (MPC) was made in June 1997.
¢ d04=99: [(2) +1, 4/1999] Extensive documentation on the Bank’s policy models is
provided in Economic Models at the Bank of England, April 1999 (see also the September
2000 Update), and the computer code of the macroeconometric model is available from
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk.
¢ d08=99 [(5) +0.5, 8/1999)] Since 1999, there has been a discussion of the Monetary
Policy Committee’s forecasting record for in‡ation and output in the August In‡ation
Report.
Note that one event has not been included due to considerable uncertainty about
the precise timing, namely: [(2) +0.5, 2002?] Time series for relevant macroeconomic
variables, including the output gap have become available from the Bank of England web
site.
Federal Reserve (Fed)
¢ d02=94: [(4) +1, 1994] The Federal Reserve (Fed) …rst provided a prompt announce-
ment of its Federal Funds rate decision in February 1994.
¢ d05=99: [(4) +1.5, 5/1999] Since May 1999, an explanation of every policy de-
cision has been provided at the time of announcement, instead of only in case of an
adjustment of the policy instrument. Furthermore, an explicit phrase that describes
the policy tilt has been included in the statement released after every policy meet-
43ing, which is further explained in the Federal Reserve Board Press Release “FOMC
announced modi…cations of its disclosure procedures”, January 19, 2000 (all available
from http://www.federalreserve.gov).
A.2 Macroeconomic Variables
This section speci…es which macroeconomic data were used in the regressions for each
central bank. It contains details about the policy rate ip, short rate is, long rate il,
medium rate im, in‡ation …; and the output gap y.
A.2.1 Quarterly data
Policy Rate (end of quarter values)
RBA: Cash rate target, end of the month (www.rba.gov.au)
ECB: Eonia, end of the month, 1994-1998; monthly averages, 1999-2002 (www.ecb.int)
BoJ: Uncollateralized overnight call rates, end of month (www.boj.or.jp)
RBNZ: Overnight inter-bank cash average, end of the month (www.rbnz.govt.nz)
SRB: Repo rate since June 1994, end of the month; marginal rate before June 1994, end
of the month (www.riksbank.com)
SNB: Three month libor rate, end of the month (www.snb.ch)
BoE: Repo rate, end of the month (www.bankofengland.co.uk)
Fed: Federal funds rate, end of the month
(www.ny.frb.org/markets/statistics/dlyrates/fedrate.html)
Short Nominal Interest Rate (last month of the quarter average)
RBA: Average rate on money market (IMF, International Financial Statistics)
ECB: Three-months money market (Datastream)
BoJ: Call money rate (MF, International Financial Statistics)
RBNZ: Money market rate (IMF, International Financial Statistics)
SRB: Call money rate (IMF, International Financial Statistics)
SNB: Money market rate (IMF, International Financial Statistics)
BoE: Overnight Interbank (MF, International Financial Statistics)
Fed: Treasury bill rate (MF, International Financial Statistics)
Long Nominal Interest Rate (end of quarter values)
RBA: Treasury bonds: 10 years, last month of the quarter (www.rba.gov.au)
ECB: Government bonds: 10 years, monthly …rst day (www.ecb.int)
44BoJ: 1992Q1-1998Q3, simple yields on TSE bonds: 10 years, selected with longest re-
maining maturity, end of the month value; for 1998Q4-2003Q4, newly issued government
bonds (10 years), end of the month value (www.boj.or.jp)
RBNZ: Sec. market government bond yields: 10 years, last day of the month
(www.rbnz.govt.nz)
SRB: 10 year government bond yield, monthly average (www.riksbank.se)
SNB: CHF Obligationen der Eidgenossenschaft, last day of the month (www.snb.che)
BoE: Nominal 10-year yield on Britisch government securities, end of the month
(www.bankofengland.co.uk)
Fed: 10 year yields on treasury securities, last day of the month
(www.ny.frb.org/markets/statistics/dlyrates/fedrate.html)
Medium Nominal Interest Rate (utilised as an instrument)
RBA: Treasury bonds: 3 years, last month of the quarter
(IMF, International Financial Statistics)
RBNZ: Secondary market government bond yields: 2 years, last day of the month
(www.rbnz.govt.nz)
BoE: Short term government bond yields, last month of the quarter
(IMF, International Financial Statistics)
Fed: Government bond yields: 3 years, last month of the quarter
(IMF, International Financial Statistics)
In‡ation (annual in‡ation based on quarterly data)
In‡ation is computed using the Consumer Price Index (IMF, International Financial
Statistics), except for the ECB for which the HICP is used (Eurostat). To be precise:
…t = (CPIt=CPIt¡4 ¡ 1) £ 100; using quarterly data.
Output Gap (based on quarterly GDP data)
The output gap is computed using quarterly data for GrossDomestic Product (OECD).
To be precise: y = (GDP=HPtrend ¡ 1) £ 100, where HPtrend is the trend based on
the Hodrick-Prescott …lter, calculated with GDP data for the period 1960-2004 (applying
E-views).
A.2.2 Monthly data
The interest rate data is the same as the data used in the quarterly regressions. Instead
the output gap data di¤ers, the GDP data is replaced by monthly production data for
the central banks for which this information is available (ECB, BoJ, SRB, BoE and Fed).
45In‡ation (annual in‡ation based on monthly data)
In‡ation is computed using the Consumer Price Index (IMF, International Financial
Statistics), except for the ECB for which the HICP is used (Eurostat). To be precise:
…t = (CPIt=CPIt¡12 ¡ 1) £ 100.
Output Gap (based onmonthly production data)
The output gap is computed using monthly (seasonally adjusted) production data
(IMF, International Financial Statistics), except for the ECB for which Eurostat data is
used. To be precise: y = (production=HPtrend ¡ 1) £ 100, where HPtrend is the trend
based on the Hodrick-Prescott …lter, calculated with production data for the period 1960-
2004 (using E-views), except for the ECB for which production data was only available
from 1985-2004.
A.3 Robustness
To test whether the results are robust for di¤erent model settings within PcGets, the
regressions were estimated with quarterly data in two extra ways. First, the same se-
lection settings are applied but the transparency dummies are not forced (NF) to show
up in the ultimately selected model. An overview of the resulting dummies is presented
in Table 16 (containing the backward looking estimation results) and in Table 17 (con-
taining the forward looking estimation results). Second, the regressions are rerun with a
more conservative strategy that minimizes non-deletion. The results are shown in Table
18 (backward looking) and in Table 19 (forward looking). When possible, the forward
looking regressions were performed with the same instruments to maintain similarity with
the baseline scenario. This was not always possible. When the p-value of a diagnostic
test was lower than 0.025, when a run time error occurred, or when the p-value of the
Sargan test was lower than 0.05, instruments that work better were, if possible, applied.
The results presented in Table 16, con…rm earlier …ndings presented in Table 14 for
the RBA, the BoJ, the RBNZ, the SRB, the SNB and the Fed. For the ECB some …ndings
di¤er. The bene…cial reputation e¤ect of the economic transparency increase disappears.
The same holds for the bene…cial ‡exibility e¤ect of increased policy transparency, but
now the e¤ect of this transparency change on the reputation of the ECB is signi…cant
and bene…cial. For the BoE not forcing all dummies to be in the selected speci…cation
leads to the …nding of two extra bene…cial e¤ects of increased transparency. The results
suggest that both the economic and operational transparency increases went along with
increased ‡exibility.
When we compare the forward looking results in Table 17 with the baseline scenario
forward looking results presented in Table 15, di¤erences for almost all countries are
found. But as before, there are no contradicting results, in the sense that a dummy
46coe¢cient is negatively signi…cant in one case but positively signi…cant when the selection
method is changed.
When the backward looking conservative regression results presented in Table 18 are
compared with the baseline scenario results shown in Table 14, it is found that there is
only one instance in which the sign of a transparency dummy changed. This is the case
for the Bank of England coe¢cient of d06=97, but it isnot important because it is close to
zero based on both settings. So these results support our previous …ndings.
Much more sign changes occur when we compare the forward looking results in Table
19, with the ones presented in Table 15. One explanation for this …nding is the use of
di¤erent instruments than in the baseline case. Only one result contradicts with previous
…ndings. The results suggest that the coe¢cient of the operational transparency change
of the BoJ, indicated by d03=01, went along with signi…cantly higher policy rates instead
of signi…cantly lower policy rates.
Overall, we can conclude that most results are robust to changes in the selection
strategy.
47Table 16: Summary of backward looking results (NF)
ip is il Flexibility Reputation
RBA
d10=01: economic -0.94 [0.01] -0.43 [0.06] - - + 0
ECB
d12=00: economic - - - - - - 0 0
d11=01: policy - - - - -0.26 [0.08] 0 +
EMU 0.35 [0.00] 0.31 [0.00] 0.52 [0.00] - -
BoJ
d01=98: political/proc. - - - - - - 0 0
d10=00: economic - - - - - - 0 0
d03=01: operational - - - - - - 0 0
RBNZ
d03=99: policy/oper. - - - - - - 0 0
d12=00: policy - - - - -0.58 [0.02] 0 +
SRB
d03=97: economic 0.54 [0.00] 0.53 [0.00] - - - 0
d01=99: political -0.38 [0.04] -0.38 [0.02] 0.58 [0.00] + -
d10=99: econ/policy - - - - - - 0 0
d03=00: operational - - - - - - 0 0
d03=02: proc/policy - - - - -0.64 [0.05] 0 +
SNB
d12=99: polit./econ./oper. - - 0.38 [0.01] -0.39 [0.01] - +
BoE
d06=97: political - - 1.37 [0.00] -1.15 [0.00] - +
d04=99: economic - - -0.90 [0.03] - - + 0
d08=99: operational -0.49 [0.01] - - - - + 0
Fed
d02=94: policy 0.50 [0.08] 0.42 [0.06] - - - 0
d05=99: policy -0.53 [0.06] -0.58 [0.00] -0.84 [0.01] + +
Note: Coe¢cient estimates for transparency indicators dMM=YY with p-values in brackets. The
additional EMU indicator for the ECB turns on January 1999. The last two columns indicate
whether the increase in transparency appears to improve (+), reduce (–) or has no e¤ect (0)
on ‡exibility and reputation.
48Table 17: Summary of forward looking results (NF)
ip is il Flexibility Reputation
RBA
d10=01: economic -0.77 [0.00] -0.54 [0.00] - - + 0
ECB
d12=00: economic - - - - - - 0 0
d11=01: policy - - - - - - 0 0
EMU - - - - - - 0 0
BoJ
d01=98: political/proc. -0.46 [0.04] - - -0.34 [0.05] + +
d10=00: economic - - - - - - 0 0
d03=01: operational 0.35 [0.13] - - - - 0 0
RBNZ
d03=99: policy/oper. - - - - - - 0 0
d12=00: policy -1.10 [0.03] -1.10 [0.03] 0.54 [0.03] + -
SRB
d03=97: economic - - 0.57 [0.00] - - - 0
d01=99: political -1.39 [0.00] -1.03 [0.00] 1.30 [0.00] + -
d10=99: econ/policy - - - - - - 0 0
d03=00: operational - - - - - - 0 0
d03=02: proc/policy - - 0.48 [0.01] -0.87 [0.03] - +
SNB
d12=99: polit./econ./oper. -1.34 [0.00] -1.67 [0.00] - - + 0
BoE
d06=97: political - - 0.61 [0.01] -2.09 [0.00] - +
d04=99: economic - - - - - - 0 0
d08=99: operational - - - - - - 0 0
Fed
d02=94: policy - - - - 1.78 [0.00] 0 -
d05=99: policy - - - - -1.30 [0.00] 0 +
Note: Coe¢cient estimates for transparency indicators dMM=YY with p-values in brackets. The
additional EMU indicator for the ECB turns on January 1999. The last two columns indicate
whether the increase in transparency appears to improve (+), reduce (–) or has no e¤ect (0)
on ‡exibility and reputation.
49Table 18: Summary of backward looking results (conservative)
ip is il Flexibility Reputation
RBA
d10=01: economic -0.94 [0.01] -0.14 [0.43] 0.03 [0.93] + 0
ECB
d12=00: economic -0.11 [0.70] -0.61 [0.01] -0.31 [0.07] + +
d11=01: policy -0.12 [0.59] -0.33 [0.21] -0.03 [0.88] 0 0
EMU 0.38 [0.00] 0.48 [0.00] 0.48 [0.00] - -
BoJ
d01=98: political/proc. -0.04 [0.84] 0.02 [0.85] -0.07 [0.74] 0 0
d10=00: economic 0.03 [0.89] -0.03 [0.74] 0.10 [0.73] 0 0
d03=01: operational 0.02 [0.92] -0.01 [0.90] 0.27 [0.38] 0 0
RBNZ
d03=99: policy/oper. -0.63 [0.18] -0.63 [0.18] 0.31 [0.22] 0 0
d12=00: policy -0.13 [0.76] -0.13 [0.76] -0.25 [0.41] 0 0
SRB
d03=97: economic 0.75 [0.00] 0.41 [0.01] 0.30 [0.19] - 0
d01=99: political -0.31 [0.18] -0.25 [0.26] 0.82 [0.02] 0 -
d10=99: econ/policy 0.18 [0.65] 0.17 [0.65] -0.91 [0.13] 0 0
d03=00: operational -0.49 [0.22] -0.20 [0.57] 0.04 [0.95] 0 0
d03=02: proc/policy -0.33 [0.18] -0.04 [0.84] -0.60 [0.09] 0 +
SNB
d12=99: polit./econ./oper. 0.06 [0.65] 0.35 [0.02] -0.39 [0.01] - +
BoE
d06=97: political 0.00 [1.00] 1.37 [0.00] -1.07 [0.00] - +
d04=99: economic -0.25 [0.48] -0.99 [0.16] 0.52 [0.28] 0 0
d08=99: operational -0.31 [0.38] 0.11 [0.88] -0.52 [0.25] 0 0
Fed
d02=94: policy 0.50 [0.08] 0.42 [0.06] 0.33 [0.25] - 0
d05=99: policy -0.53 [0.06] -0.58 [0.00] -0.12 [0.52] + 0
Note: Coe¢cient estimates for transparency indicators dMM=YY with p-values in brackets. The
additional EMU indicator for the ECB turns on January 1999. The last two columns indicate
whether the increase in transparency appears to improve (+), reduce (–) or has no e¤ect (0)
on ‡exibility and reputation.
50Table 19: Summary of forward looking results (conservative)
ip is il Flexibility Reputation
RBA
d10=01: economic -0.74 [0.00] -0.40 [0.02] 0.03 [0.93] + 0
ECB
d12=00: economic -0.67 [0.00] -0.60 [0.14] -1.61 [0.18] + 0
d11=01: policy 0.14 [0.55] -1.85 [0.00] -1.79 [0.06] + +
EMU 0.24 [0.07] -0.64 [0.14] -0.50 [0.75] - 0
BoJ
d01=98: political/proc. -0.22 [0.36] -0.05 [0.67] -0.24 [0.23] 0 0
d10=00: economic -0.30 [0.40] 0.12 [0.37] 0.20 [0.47] 0 0
d03=01: operational 0.35 [0.08] -0.01 [0.87] 0.11 [0.69] - 0
RBNZ
d03=99: policy/oper. -0.18 [0.72] -0.18 [0.72] 0.31 [0.22] 0 0
d12=00: policy -1.97 [0.00] -1.97 [0.00] -0.25 [0.41] + 0
SRB
d03=97: economic 0.81 [0.00] 0.55 [0.00] -0.10 [0.67] - 0
d01=99: political -0.85 [0.00] -1.05 [0.00] 0.67 [0.09] + -
d10=99: econ/policy -0.34 [0.35] -0.00 [0.99] -0.45 [0.49] 0 0
d03=00: operational -0.55 [0.09] 0.10 [0.72] 0.33 [0.59] + 0
d03=02: proc/policy 0.41 [0.04] 0.46 [0.01] -0.11 [0.76] - 0
SNB
d12=99: polit./econ./oper. -1.67 [0.00] 0.14 [0.33] 0.01 [0.95] + 0
BoE
d06=97: political 0.29 [0.06] 0.51 [0.10] -1.34 [0.00] - +
d04=99: economic -0.32 [0.39] -0.56 [0.45] 0.02 [0.97] 0 0
d08=99: operational -0.24 [0.48] 0.51 [0.47] -0.21 [0.60] 0 0
Fed
d02=94: policy 0.10 [0.57] 0.08 [0.74] 1.73 [0.00] 0 -
d05=99: policy -0.33 [0.02] -0.17 [0.27] -1.00 [0.00] + +
Note: Coe¢cient estimates for transparency indicators dMM=YY with p-values in brackets. The
additional EMU indicator for the ECB turns on January 1999. The last two columns indicate
whether the increase in transparency appears to improve (+), reduce (–) or has no e¤ect (0)
on ‡exibility and reputation.
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